

\*\*\*\*\* Special Issue \*\*\*\*\*

# Stanford Research Goes to War

By David Ranson

SRI SAYS THAT IT WANTS TO WIN THE WAR IN VIETNAM. BOTH THE WAR AND SRI'S POSITION ON IT ARE PREDICTABLE GIVEN SRI'S HISTORY OF SIMPLE ANTI-COMMUNISM AND ITS ENCOURAGEMENT OF AGGRESSIVE FOREIGN INVESTMENT. IN FACT SRI PUBLICATIONS PREDICT THE WAR AS EARLY AS 1957 AND SUGGEST HOW IT WILL BE FOUGHT AND HOW IT OUGHT TO BE RESOLVED. SRI RESEARCH HAS TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF THE WAR NEEDS TO DEVELOP NEW AND IMPROVED WEAPONS AND WEAPONS SYSTEMS WHICH TENANTS OF THE STANFORD INDUSTRIAL PARK, CONTROLLED BY STANFORD TRUSTEES, DIRECTORS OF SRI, AND STANFORD FACULTY MEMBERS, NOW MANUFACTURE. STANFORD AND SRI HAVE HELPED DEVELOP THE METHODS AND THE MUNITIONS FOR CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE, INCLUDING THOSE USED IN VIETNAM. SRI MEMBERS AND SRI PROJECTS HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO MAJOR STRATEGIC DECISIONS IN VIETNAM, AND THEY ARE CONTINUING TO DO SO. THESE FACTS ARE DEVELOPED AND EXPLAINED IN THE FOLLOWING ARTICLE.

"To promote and foster the application of science in the development of commerce, trade, and industry...[for] the improvement of the general standard of living and the peace and prosperity of mankind."

—Stanford Research Institute

Both SRI and Stanford University deny they are intimately connected, but the truth is otherwise. In 1964, when the Government accused SRI of having swindled it of \$250,000 (for charging the Government, as client, for depreciation on buildings which it had donated to the University, and which the University had then donated to SRI), the General Accounting Office remarked that the Institute had itself acknowledged "that the close ties with Stanford University are clear cut and unmistakable as evidenced by the fact that the trustees of the University are the general members of the Institute and elect the Institute's Board of Directors." The GAO also noted that the number of Stanford trustees serving as members of the board of SRI had increased from six to eight in the previous eight years, and it concluded that "the trustees of Stanford University, acting as general members of the Institute and as electors of the directors of the Institute, are in a position to exercise control of the Institute as well as of the University regardless of the Institute's statement to the contrary." Ernest Arbuckle, Dean of the Business School and a former Stanford Trustee, is presently Chairman of the Board at SRI, replacing Wallace Sterling, who remains a director.

SRI executives like to boast of their connections with the University. In a speech given at a banquet of the Bay Area Engineering Societies in 1955, Jesse Hobson, then President of SRI, said that "we participate in an honors graduate study program at Stanford University, contribute to the University's general funds, and provide assistance to

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## RESISTANCE

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### Corporations and The Men From SRI

By John Saari

FOLLOWING ARE PROFILES OF SOME OF THE CORPORATIONS WHOSE DIRECTORS ARE ALSO DIRECTORS OF SRI.

#### FMC

FMC Corp., San Jose, which at times has had as many as three Stanford Trustees and three SRI Directors on its board (presently: William Hewlett, Stanford, Paul L. Davies, SRI), is a major arms contributor to Vietnam and it expects its "defense" business to grow: "Development programs now underway give promise to provide important additions to volume in the years ahead and to further enhance FMC's position as one of the most experienced developers and producers of specialized defense material" (Annual Report, 1966).

PR men for FMC tell you "there isn't

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### Trust the Trustees?

By Robert Hass

The profiles which follow demonstrate some of the connections between the men who run Stanford University and the war in Vietnam. For those of us who are opposed to the war for moral and political reasons and who do not believe that the cause of the war is merely a foreign policy too rigidly anti-communist, the profiles may also be seen as the beginning of an effort to understand the causes of American foreign policy.

I do not mean to make the crude suggestion that the Vietnam War is only a creation of the American profit system, but two generalizations on the subject can be made:

- (1) An American victory in Vietnam will have the effect of protecting the massive American investments in the underdeveloped

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# EDITORIAL SRI...

Although David Ransom's article on SRI is unusually long, we have published it in its entirety because we feel that to describe accurately the almost endless interrelations between Stanford University, Stanford Industrial Park, Stanford Research Institute, the Trustees, etc. and the war in Vietnam requires at least the amount of space he has devoted to it. An article of such length may appear overwhelming to the casual reader, but if given a chance, the sheer weight of its accumulated evidence begins to tell—you can't get half-way through the article without wondering "Can all this be happening here?" or "Why is all this happening here?"

We have not sought in this issue to present a theoretical context into which the various articles can be placed. We are very much concerned, however, with providing such a context and we intend to do this in our next issues, along with the research we will continue to publish. As we do our research a context emerges which in turn gives direction to further research.

A context is already emerging from these articles which, if developed, we believe will provide answers to the questions "Why is all this happening?" and "Why here?" It is that the war in Vietnam is no simple case of misguided anti-communism, no aberration of an otherwise pure American society, but rather a symptom of the disease which pervades every aspect of it—imperialism is a natural product of American society.

In this issue we are presented with profiles of some of the men who help create and materially support American military/foreign policy. For the most part, these men at the top of the structure of military research, development and production give frank expression to what can only be called imperialistic doctrine. (See particularly the remarks of Weldon Gibson, Vice-President of SRI, and former SRI president, Jesse Hobson). They are, however, only part of the whole structure, the top of the corporate pyramid. What of those men whose public expressions are not openly imperialistic—the men who see world problems in more sophisticated and seemingly well-informed terms—the liberals who work for men like Ducommun and Lewis, Hewlett and Packard, Hobson and Gibson?

Perhaps our best example is that of Eugene Staley, senior economist at SRI and Professor of Education at Stanford. In the 1950's, as David Ransom's article shows, Staley was among the few men who argued for a policy toward the Third World which eschewed reliance on military solutions and sought answers to the problems of the have-not nations in terms of economic and educational aid. He was a liberal—at a time when Hobson and Gibson were frankly concerned with keeping what this country had. Today we find little to differentiate Staley from them in terms of the service he performs—as co-author of the strategic hamlet idea which our military is using to help win the war in Vietnam. Gibson and Staley are both part of an organization which predicted the need for such a war, and is now providing whatever help it can in the fighting of it.

--Ira Arlook

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its educational activities in various other ways."

## 67% of the World's Wealth

Perhaps it is with a statement Hobson made in 1951 that we can begin to understand SRI's involvement in Vietnam, Vietnam the symptom. Though Hobson is blunter than we would now expect, it is not that he is unsophisticated, but that the era was more honest, or more open. In an address made at the American Institute of Electrical Engineers at Madison, Wisconsin, Hobson said: "This nation occupies 6 per cent of the land area of the world, has 7 per cent of the world's population; but it now produces 50 per cent of the world's goods and possesses 67 per cent of the world's wealth. Research must be the heart, the foundation, the life-blood of our present defense economy if we are to maintain this position."

In the same year, Weldon S. Gibson, the chairman of SRI's Department of Industrial Economics, and a man from whom we will hear more, in an address to the California State Chamber of Commerce, remarked that he thought the nation was passing through what he described as "a period of consolidation in the world struggle against Communism" (my emphasis) and looked forward to "a further major increase in defense spending and other mobilization activities."

These themes—"maintaining" tremendous wealth, mounting a "world struggle against Communism," and looking forward to increased "defense" spending inform SRI thinking to date and imply, I believe, the war in Vietnam.

## Stake in Stability

We come closer to Vietnam itself with SRI's increasing interest and involvement in what we now call the Third World. In 1957, speaking to a conference sponsored by the Stanford Alumni Association on "America's Stake in World Economic Stability," Henry Robison, a "Senior Economist" at SRI, began by saying that "since World War II, the United States has been thrust upon the world's stage in a position of power and influence probably undreamed of even by those statesmen of a past generation who were imbued with the spirit of manifest destiny." Discussing "the economic factors which underly the political relationships" between America and the Third World, he asserted that the countries of South-east Asia "are more important for their geographic position than for their economic potential." Arguing that "at last freed of the Western political domination of the past century," he maintained that it is essential "that their progress be made under Western guidance and Western concepts of individual freedom rather than under the heavy hand of Communist slavery," a statement of surely unintentional irony. Robison concluded that "The free world must not lose South-east Asia...as it has already lost China."

In the same year, SRI researched, wrote, and published for McDonnell Aircraft, a study called "Environmental Conditions in Selected Areas of Potent-

ial Limited Warfare," which characterized itself as reviewing "the basic strategic and tactical considerations of limited warfare . . . and environment which would affect the conduct of small wars in various peripheral areas of Asia," one of the "Southeast Asia." As this study seems clearly to predict (by advising) present political and military policy, and does so in language important both for its assumptions and its openness, we will look at it in some detail.

## Indigenous Participants

The initial premise of "Limited Warfare" seems to have been that "possession of global nuclear attack capabilities" by both the United States and the Soviet Union has "increased the likelihood that Communist aggression will be directed toward the peripheral areas of Asia." It notes that these areas are "generally characterized by political instability, social unrest, and very low standards of living, 'factors which make them extremely vulnerable to communism.'" The United States will be inclined to "counter aggression" wherever it occurs, though "for indigenous participants, limited warfare is likely to appear as civil war." While, in limited warfare, "the national existence of the major power participants would not be endangered," in contrast, "the national existence of indigenous participants...might well be threatened." Nonetheless, since the United States holds "heavy responsibility for enforcing the peace on a global basis," dealing with "minor aggression and limited overt Communist intervention...within or without the framework of the United Nations...may be the most serious strategic problem facing the United States for some time."

Hopefully it is unnecessary for me to point out the blind assumptions that communism is monolithic and that, though "vulnerable" to communism, the countries of the Third World can be allowed to have none of it, the intention being, on the contrary, to "enforce the peace" (alone, if necessary), though the conflict be "civil war," and though American intervention threaten the national existence of the Asians in question. Vietnam.

The 1957 study suggests how this should be done: "Instantly ready, mobile task forces, characterized by very great firepower in relation to manpower commitment," appear necessary. It seems desirable "to conceive of the ground forces as air transportable and supportable," and the study saw need for "the development of dependable off-the-road surface vehicles, and...of radically new aircraft and theater air transport systems" including helicopters. Vietnam. "Total destruction or unconditional surrender of the enemy normally would not be the basic military objective. Instead, it would be to deny the enemy his objective and, when appropriate, to give him an opportunity to negotiate a settlement." Vietnam, 1957. By "the enemy" the study does not mean the insurgents.

## WEAPONS FOR "LIMITED WAR"

SRI has had a great deal to do with the development and testing of just such weapons for just such wars as "Limited Warfare" suggests, and SRI "Associates" (Cont. p.3, col.1)

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# SRI...

(Cont. from p.2)

have benefitted by it. In their program for the Army's "Combat Development Experimentation Center" at Fort Ord, where most of their work has been classified, SRI has conducted "scientific studies" on electronic warfare systems (\$1.6 million in 1963) and as SRI's man, Maurice Chorness, said at the Army's Human Factors Research and Development conference last October, SRI has studied "the effects of altitudes, speeds, paths... upon aircraft vulnerability," more particularly the vulnerability of helicopters, to ground fire—a long-standing problem in Fort Ord's development of combat. SRI's experiments with war have provided its largest single contract—\$2.8 million in 1965 for its Fort Ord work. Vietnam.

Furthermore, in 1963, the U.S. Army's Electronic Material Agency awarded SRI a \$583,000 contract to do a study in "airborne position location techniques: mapping, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems, including drones." This became a \$2.2 million contract in 1966 in "basic research in surveillance processes," and last year was a \$164,000 contract for "services and material to perform study entitled 'contribution of ground reconnaissance and surveillance systems to tactical reconnaissance.'" Vietnam.

In 1966 SRI did research in "aircraft guided missiles" (\$73,000). Its 1963 and 1964 contracts in "certain research studies and evaluations of requirements for air and missile defense of continental U.S. and field armies" (\$1.6 million), were continued in 1966 (\$1.3 million) and concern the Hawk missile (Vietnam) and the Nike-X (anti-missile missile).

Also in 1963/64, and again for the Army's Electronic Material Agency, SRI performed two hurry-up ("two months") contracts "directed toward improvement of tropic military communications" and "data applicable to jungle communication." Obviously Vietnam. Research "directed toward the improvement" of jungle communications was continued in a million dollar contract last year and will presumably be continued this year.

## Community

We get some insight into SRI's role in Provost Emeritus Frederick Terman's "community of technical scholars" (including the University, and the Industrial Park) when we note (as in our last issue) that corporations heavily involved in manufacturing Hawk and Nike-X, reconnaissance and surveillance systems, and airborne and ground-based military communications systems in Vietnam—such things as have been researched by SRI—are major tenants of the Park and are controlled by Trustees, SRI Directors, and members of the Stanford faculty.

Applied Technology, for instance, whose directors include E. Finley Carter (Pres. of SRI, 1959-63), William Rambo (Prof. of Electrical Engineering at Stanford and Director of the Stanford Electronics Labs), and Oswald Villard (Professor of Electrical Engineering, and Director of the Stanford Radioscience Labs) contributes to the manufacture of reconnaissance and surveillance systems



for aircraft presently in use in Vietnam.

Granger Associates, whose directors include the man who probably also directed SRI's research, Allen M. Peterson (Professor of Electrical Engineering and Assistant Director of the Electronics and Radiosciences Division at SRI) as well as David Packard (Stanford Trustee and Director of SRI) and Fred Terman himself (himself once an SRI Director) manufactures communications equipment.

Varian Associates (Dean Arbuckle, who believes there is no military-industrial complex, was until October of 1965 a director of Varian and is, of course, presently Chairman of the Board of SRI) contributes to Hawk, Nike-X and "airborne and ground based military communications systems in Vietnam." And Watkins-Johnson (Arbuckle, W.R. Hewlett—Stanford Trustee and director of Hewlett-Packard, and Dean Watkins—Stanford Trustee and President of this firm) contributes to reconnaissance and surveillance systems. Vietnam. Vietnam.

As "SRI Associates," Granger, Hewlett-Packard, and other Trustee-controlled corporations such as the Kern County Land Company (Arbuckle and Hewlett) contribute yearly, tax-deductible donations of \$15,000 and upwards toward the improvement of SRI's research facilities.

This leaves out of account such enterprises as FMC (whose directors include Hewlett and Paul Davies, a director of SRI), which is both an SRI Associate and a manufacturer of material for the Hawk missile system. Also involved in these weapons and in one or more of the following—Stanford University, Stanford Industrial Park, Stanford Research Institute—are Eastman-Kodak, IBM, Itek, Fairchild Camera and Instrument, Lockheed, Teledyne...but the list

of Stanford-connected corporations whose way manufacturing benefits from SRI research goes on and on.

## RESISTANCE AND CIVIL WAR

In 1963, when much of SRI's research was heavily involved in problems relating to Vietnam, the solutions of which presumably helped prepare for our massive entry into South Vietnam and for the bombing of the North, SRI again contributed to the development of the military theory, or rationale, under which our invasion is taking place.

Carl H. Amme, Captain, U.S. Navy (Retired) and a member of SRI's "Defense" Analysis Center in that year submitted a prize-winning essay on "The Changing Nature of Power" to the Naval Institute, which argued in part that "when internal changes within (the Third World) do not keep pace with expectations, the climate becomes ripe for revolution." "Here," he continued, "the excess energies of the dominant powers often find release in supporting one faction or the other. Military power takes the form of insurgency and counter-insurgency." Amme defined insurgency as "the beginning of overt armed resistance against the government" (italics mine) and remarked that "timeliness is the essential element to nip it in the bud before it becomes a full-scale civil war as it became in Indochina in 1953 and in Algeria in 1955." He defines counter-insurgency as "the technique of using in appropriate combination, all elements of national power in support of a friendly government which is in danger of being overthrown by an active Communist campaign designed to organize, mobilize, and direct discontented elements of the local

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population against the government. The emphasis added in this paragraph is mine. Captain Amme's assumptions that we will always be involved in counter-insurgency operations, though "resistance" may be civil war, seem characteristic both of our present policy and working ideology.

Ammé suggested as policy that "the presence of American forces on the scene leaves the enemy with little illusion that the United States will stand aloof from involvement." Cautioning that "if the enemy succeeds in toppling the government, then intervention by us against the new government becomes an act of war," he advised that "the Marine Corps could well begin to look at counter-insurgency as a principal mission."

Surely he was pleased to see his thinking horn out in our clear opposition to significant revolution in both Vietnam and the Dominican Republic in 1965.

#### CHEMICAL BIOLOGICAL WARFARE (STANFORD)

If Captain Amme's thinking is characteristic of the policy which supported Diem and his successors against "resistance" in Vietnam, the McDonnell study, "Limited War", suggested a weapons policy with which SRI has since been closely connected: chemical and biological warfare. It remarked that weapons limitations "are not inherent in a definition of limited warfare." "Numerous military authorities believe that we should never again restrict our freedom of selection of weapons as we did in Korea," it continued. "It is detrimental to the military situation to positively assure an aggressor or enemy that a particular weapon will not be used." Vietnam.

During the Korean war, chemical warfare agents were prohibited and, though a group of European medical men concluded after inspection that the U.S. had introduced anthrax, cholera, and plague against China, this at very least was not public policy. Such is not now the case.

#### 'War Without Death'

According to Elinor Langer in *Science*, the journal of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, "the current CBW program is the product of decisions made and steps taken during the late 1950's and early 1960's." Before then, "the Chemical Corps had a message it had been repeating since World War I--that its wares were unusually humane--but no one was buying." But in 1959, "the Corps took matters into its own hands and went to the public with a full-scale publicity campaign known as 'Operation Blue Skies.' It was a period of fascination with the possibility of 'incapacitating' weapons, particularly psychochemicals...and, putting aside its more lethal products, what the Chemical Corps advertised...was 'war without death.'"

At that time, high-ranking faculty members in chemistry at Stanford did research which provides the foundation for the present chemical and biological warfare arsenal available to the Pentagon.

From before November of 1959 until some time after June of 1961, Prof. Philip Leighton and Dr. William Perkins of Stan-

ford conducted research into "Meteorological Aspects of CBR (Chemical-Biological-Radiological) Warfare" at Stanford and the U.S. Army Chemical Corps Proving Ground, Dugway, Utah, which "occupies an area in Utah larger than the state of Rhode Island," and which Elinor Langer says is "the principal station for field assessment and testing of chemical and biological munitions."

Perkins got his PhD at Stanford in 1942 and acted as a resident associate in chemistry from 1946 to 1950 at which time he became both Associate Director of the Stanford Aerosol Lab, which was run by the Department of Chemistry and Chemical Engineering, and a consultant and member of the advisory council for the Chemical Corps, positions he held at least through 1961. In Government task reports he figures sometimes as a Dugway investigator and others as a Stanford investigator.

Dr. Leighton, who was awarded the Legion of Merit for "his research work with incendiary bombs" during World War II, was a professor in Chemistry from 1937 to 1962, head of the department from 1940 to 1952 and dean of the school of physical sciences from 1946 to 1949. In the CBW research he was a principal Stanford investigator.

What these men were involved in for the Chemical Corps was work "to improve the knowledge of the effects of meteorological conditions on the behavior of aerosols and particulates." Its scope was total: "the development of new models to describe: diffusion processes, and the behavior of particulates in downwind travel from all source types, for all climate and vegetation and terrain situations" (italics mine). In June of 1961 the status of their research was that "trials are being conducted in a mountain-valley complex;...a contract will be let on tropical rain forest canopy penetration." Vietnam.

The significance of this research only becomes clear when one knows that five of the seven chemical agents currently listed in the new Army field manual, "Employment of Chemical and Biological Agents" (1966), including nerve gas, are disseminated as aerosols, and the other two are still "airborne". Furthermore, according to Elinor Langer, "the idea of disseminating infectious agents by aerosols--suspensions of small particles in the air--seems to be displacing earlier notions about how to transmit disease" in biological warfare. The success of the defoliation and crop destruction now practiced in Vietnam (500,000 acres of jungle and 150,000 acres of cropland according to the Pentagon--to be tripled in 1967) may well be the result of Stanford's research.

Most probably, what research Leighton and Perkins did at Stanford was done in the Aerosol Lab. Also in June of 1961, David Prophet, a research assistant in chemistry, published a bibliography for the Chemical Corps at the Aerosol Lab which described itself as reviewing "literature bearing on the transport and behavior of airborne material over certain types of complex terrain." Prophet remained at the Aerosol Lab until recently, when he left to join Lockheed, even after the lab became Metronics Associates Inc. in the Industrial Park, under the management of Leighton (who is presently an emeritus professor at Stanford and

Chairman of the Board at Metronics) and Perkins (currently a lecturer in physical sciences and President of Metronics)--and under circumstances which are still unclear to me. Mr. Gary Harmon, Metronics' business manager, has told me that there was no bill of sale in the transfer as there were no assets transferred. He assured me that Metronics did no CBW work. According to material published by the Palo Alto Chamber of Commerce, "the research of Metronics Associates deals with the atmosphere as it affects humans, other living organisms, and plant life. It relates to physics and chemistry characteristics of air pollutants, including applications to agriculture and industry." Dr. Perkins has, in fact, done a good deal of work on smog, as have some of those connected with CBW research at SRI.

#### CBW (SRI)

At the same time that Leighton and Perkins were discovering for the Chemical Corps how aerosols behaved and how they might penetrate jungle canopies, researchers at SRI were discovering how to make them. That research has continued and become investigation into the dispersal of chemical munitions, at least one of which is in use in Vietnam.

In 1959 Wilfred Skinner, senior organic chemist at SRI, and Richard Cadle, SRI's manager of atmospheric chemistry and physics, who has since joined the Government's National Center for Atmospheric Research in Boulder, Colorado, were both involved in the Chemical Corps program, particularly obtaining "fundamental information on the formation of encapsulated aerosols for possible application to the solution of problems on the dissemination of chemical agents." That work led to a three-year contract which began in 1963 "for investigations of incapacitating chemical materials" (\$1.1 million) and, in 1964, a contract for "the dissemination of chemical solid and liquid materials" (\$2.5 million) which is scheduled to terminate next September.

What all this entails is clear from a memorandum drawn up by SRI last year. According to the memorandum, "the objective of this research is to provide fundamental information necessary for overall improvement of dissemination techniques applicable to chemical munitions."

"Every effort is being made," the memorandum continues, "to coordinate the program at Stanford Research Institute with the requirements of Edgewood Arsenal so that information derived from this program can be utilized most effectively by the U.S. Army in chemical weapons research and development programs."

SRI works with CS, "one of the more recently developed agents of the general tear-gas type," (Langer), which according to the Army manual "are used in offensive operations where it is desired to disable enemy troops for a limited period of time." The manual suggests they be used "to 'flush out' unmasked enemy troops from concealed or protected positions." This gas has been extensively used in Vietnam to "flush out" people from shelters dug beneath their homes. For the old, the sick, and in a closed space the gas can kill.

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The airplane that is made for this kind of fighting is called the F-5.

**NORTHROP**

## Saari...

(Cont. from p.1)

anything we eat--that we buy in the store to eat--that we haven't got something to do with here at FMC." But FMC's history in the last five years has been one of war industry increase--FMC is doing all it can to make all it can out of the Vietnam war.

In 1959 FMC, whose researchers at that time were synthesizing "fifty-two compounds (which) played important roles in the lethal and incapacitating programs" of the Army Chemical Corps, Edgewood Arsenal, built and has since staffed "24 hours a day" a plant in Newport, Indiana, which manufactures Saari, one of the two nerve gases in the Pentagon's chemical munitions arsenal.

In 1962 FMC opened new plants at its Charleston, W. Va., armament location, and in 1964 it bought Northern Ordnance Co. in Minneapolis, which last year did heavy business in missile launchers and rapid-fire gun turrets.

In 1965 FMC bought Gunderson Bros., a boat-building firm which last year manufactured a new type of 70-foot aluminum gunboat for the Navy, presumably for Vietnam. Also in 1965, FMC opened Defense Technology Laboratories in Santa Clara, which last year opened two ammunition lines and produces mortar shells and projectiles for the Army "plus various types of classified ammunition."

Meanwhile, its previous armament facilities have continued and expanded their production. Last year the Charleston plant produced the greater amount of FMC's M113 series of armored personnel carriers, generally used in Vietnam and increasingly exported to "the free world" and the San Jose Ordnance Plant supplied "combat bulldozers" to the Marine Corps. Research and development included "work on a system to increase the lateral dispersion of munitions when delivered from low-flying aircraft." Facilities at the Charleston plant and at Gunderson Bros.

are being expanded "to keep pace with normal production schedules." And FMC's Inorganic Chemistry Division increased its production of elemental phosphorus--presumably to meet the demand for burnt flesh in Vietnam--by 15%.

Some of FMC's contracts last year were a \$100 million 3-year contract for M113 vehicles; \$4.25 million for assault support boats; \$6 million for anti-personnel shells; and \$12 million to build a prototype assault amphibian personnel carrier.

FMC military backlogs jumped from \$88 million in 1959 to \$183 million in 1964 to \$259 last year. Profits were up by 10% last year.

Eat well, guys.

Douglas--McDonnell

In fiscal 1966 the Douglas Aircraft Company was the nation's 24th largest war contractor with contracts totaling \$278.9 million. Douglas is connected to Stanford through Donald W. Douglas Jr., who is president of the company and a director of SRI. Despite the war in Vietnam Douglas managed to lose \$27.6 million last year. Nevertheless, the company contributed significantly to the war effort supplying A4 bombers, bomb racks for F4 and F105 aircraft, and counter-measure sets. Also, Douglas stands to make huge profits from the Nike Zeus if the anti-ballistic missile system is approved.

However, Douglas did lose money in 1966. The reasons are twofold. First, miscalculations in the demand for DC9 commercial aircraft leading to a loss of \$600,000 per plane, and second to further production delays caused by increased government demand for the A4. Of the major aircraft firms, Douglas was the most intent on expanding its commercial sales to offset its dependency on military contracts. This type of corporate responsibility proved unprofitable and therefore Douglas will merge with McDonnell Aircraft on April 28th of this year.

McDonnell Aircraft Corporation is a firm of a different nature. It is a

company shaped in the image of its founder president, James McDonnell (see *Resist*, March 31, 1967) and bills itself "the industrial team of human beings serving the community and the nation and the free world." In fiscal 1966 it was the 6th ranking war contractor with \$722.2 million in contracts.

Until the merger, the company had no direct ties with Stanford, although in 1957 SRI did a report for McDonnell entitled "Environmental Conditions in Selected Areas of Potential Limited Warfare", which pinpointed Vietnam as a probable area of conflict and suggested the development of aircraft that "should be capable of operating from small, unprepared or hastily prepared landing areas... They should climb and descend at steep angles to avoid high terrain... They should be capable of operating in diverse climates... All aircraft should have the greatest practicable ferry range to permit easy deployment to combat theaters."

Strangely, McDonnell produces the F4 Phantom Jet, the most popular plane used in Vietnam, and even more strangely, the F4 possesses all the above enviable properties. Indeed contracts for the F4 comprise more than 90% of McDonnell's war contracts and the need to diversify products is the major factor behind the McDonnell-Douglas merger from McDonnell's point of view. At any rate, the McDonnell-Douglas Corporation with timely assistance from SRI will continue to be "the industrial team of human beings serving the community and the nation and the free world."

Northrop Corporation

In fiscal 1966 the Northrop Corporation was the 25th ranking war contractor with \$276 million. Northrop is connected to Stanford through Thomas Jones, President and Chairman of the Board of Northrop and an SRI director, and through Edwin Carter, a director of the corporation and of SRI. Northrop is a smart, well-diversified war corporation, as is evidenced by the \$93 million in war contracts that went to their Page Communications subsidiary and by their proud assertion in the 1965 Annual Report: "much of the diversity of our defense activities and products flows from basic decisions taken sometime ago to focus the company's technical effort on requirements for the conduct of limited military operations."

Moving to our present theater "of limited military operations," Northrop supplies the F-5 tactical fighter, "an example of a weapon system designed and equipped to engage in the type of actions which have become characteristic of modern, limited warfare." Also, in Vietnam Northrop's Page Communications subsidiary designed, installed, and maintains the Army communications systems linking combat facilities, while at home Northrop Northrop has expanded its ordnance facility to make such goodies as 106 mm and 105 mm anti-personnel projectiles. One can only wonder what would have happened if some time ago Northrop had decided to focus the company's technical effort on requirements for limiting military operations. Oh well, bring on Thailand, or is it Bolivia? It doesn't matter as long as we "engage in the type of actions which have become characteristic of modern, limited warfare".

# Trustees...

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countries by putting a high price on human lives or social revolution.

- (2) American businessmen are making a great deal of money out of the Vietnam War. Profits are not always as high in defense work as they are for investments in the private sector and not all businessmen are benefitting from the war, but many corporations, including those directed by Stanford trustees, have a very considerable interest in the war effort.

Finally, I do not mean to suggest that the men discussed below are wicked human beings. Muckraking is a matter of selection and I do not discuss Dean Arbuckle's Silver Star or the philanthropic activities of Hewlett and Ducommun because these things have no discernible relation to the fact that they have chosen, for whatever reasons, to traffic in bombs, barbed wire, machine guns, bombers, and poison gas.

## Economic Interest

Any student of society will wish to know what a man's interests are. These men have an economic interest in the Vietnam war and that war forcibly reminds us that it is important to understand not only what a man says, but what he does. The devastated peoples of Vietnam will draw little comfort from Hewlett's \$2000 medical electronics scholarships, and still less from Ducommun's patronage of the Los Angeles Symphony Association, and none at all from their good intentions.

If these men are acting altruistically, then their best interests are being brutally degraded by the context in which they have chosen to work. That assumption both makes them appear more sympathetic and robs them of their freedom as human agents. In either case, it also heightens one's sense of the repugnant nature of the context. Stanford, its research institute, and its industrial park may be a microcosm of that context -- the world of technological expertise, high level councils of world trade and foreign policy, appointments to the Department of Defense and Commerce which one glimpses in reading about the careers of the Stanford Trustees, for at the center of it is the production of an arsenal terrifying in its capacity and bewildering in its implications.

Here are the profiles:

Ernest C. Arbuckle has been Dean of the graduate school of Business since 1958 and Chairman of the Board of Directors of SRI since early last year. From 1954 to 1958 he was a trustee of the University and chairman of the Planning and Development Committee.

Dean Arbuckle, who last year told a Daily reporter that he does not "believe that 'the military-industrial complex' exists," is a director of many corporations including Hewlett-Packard, Utah Mining & Construction Company, and Kern County Land Company. Until October 1965, he was also a director of Varian Associates. All of these companies are tenants of Stanford Industrial Park.

Hewlett-Packard (see Reference #1)

does only \$4 million worth of business with the armed forces, but Utah M & C, Watkins-Johnson Co. which is controlled by Kern County Land, and Varian make air-bases, military research and reconnaissance equipment, and anti-personnel mine dispersal systems, respectively.

## Civic Affairs

The Dean has also been active in civic affairs. For example, he is a member of governor Ronald Reagan's Advisory Task Force to the Director of Finance, the gentleman who has made such a notable contribution to the debate on the future of higher education in California. At the national level, Dean Arbuckle served as a member of President Johnson's Committee for Private Enterprise in Foreign Aid. The Committee made many important recommendations in 1963, including the ones which would apply a 7% tax credit to all U.S. private investment in Thailand and a tax credit equal to 30% of the investment by U.S. investors in "productive facilities in the less developed countries."

David Packard, Stanford's Distinguished Alumnus for 1966, is Chairman of the Board of Hewlett-Packard. Graduated from Stanford with an A.B. in 1934 and an E.E. degree in 1939, Mr. Packard is a trustee of Stanford University, a director of SRI, and a member of the Advisory Board to the Hoover Institute on War, Peace, and Revolution.

In addition to his work at Hewlett-Packard and the Stanford complex, Mr. Packard is a director of General Dynamics Corp., and U.S. Steel. These companies are engaged in the manufacture of F-111 tactical fighters, nuclear submarines, avionics systems (for target finding and accurate bombing), FB-111 bombers, Redey air defense missiles, anti-submarine systems, prefabricated landing strips, barbed wire, guided missile warheads, Mark 82 bomb bodies, and Little John Rockets. Systems Development Corporation, a not-for-profit institute of which Mr. Packard was a director until 1965, does 83% of its business with the U.S. Air Force, 7% for the Army & Navy, and 4% for other Defense Department agencies.

Mr. Packard has been a director of the World Affairs Council of Northern California since 1958 and served as director of the American Management Association from 1956 to 1959.

William E. Hewlett is, one feels assured in saying, the partner of David Packard. Mr. Hewlett received his A.B. at Stanford in 1934 and his E.E. degree in 1939. He has been a trustee of Stan-



ford University since 1963. He is the president of Hewlett-Packard and inventor of the audio-oscillator (an inexpensive and efficient device that cut the cost of previous measuring equipment by 75%) which became H-P's leading product.

Mr. Hewlett, like Mr. Packard, is director of many corporations, including Watkins-Johnson, Kern County Land Co., RAND Corporation and FMC. Until 1965, he was also a director of Rexcell Products Inc. Thus, Mr. Hewlett is in the business of designing and/or producing military search & reconnaissance receiver equipment, M 113 armored personnel vehicles, Minute man weapons systems, several missile systems, the honeycomb material for helicopters, missiles, and support aircraft and casings for atomic demolition devices. The RAND corporation is, of course, the braintrust which has a six-figure budget of \$19 million annually from the Defense Department for policy studies and military planning.

## Lethal Nerve Gas

One interesting aspect of Mr. Hewlett's work is that FMC, of which he is director, manufactures Sarin, a lethal nerve gas called "a strategic defense chemical" in FMC's Annual Report for 1965. Sarin, which is odorless, colorless, and poisonous in minute quantities, produces in order of appearance the following effects:

"...running nose; lightness of chest; dimness of vision & pinpointing of the eye pupils; difficulty in breathing; drooling & excessive sweating; nausea, vomiting, cramps, and involuntary defecation and urination; twitching, jerking, and staggering and headache, drowsiness, coma, and convulsion. These symptoms are followed by cessation of breathing and death.... Although skin absorption is great enough to cause death to occur in 1 or 2 minutes, death may be delayed for 1 or 2 hours. Respiratory lethal doses kill in 1 to 10 minutes, and liquid in the eye kills nearly or rapidly."

(Army technical manual TM 3-215 Military Chemistry and Chemical Agents)

In 1966 Mr. Hewlett was appointed a four-year term on President Johnson's Science Advisory Committee.

Charles Ducommun graduated from Stanford in 1935 and he has been a trustee of the University since 1961, and served on the PACE national executive committee. He is the secretary and director of Ducommun.

(Cont. p.9, col.1)

# SRI...

(Cont. from p.4)

EMC Corporation, the board of directors of which has, at times, included three Stanford Trustees and three directors of SRI, is also heavily involved in poison gases, having done research in their preparation and, since 1959, having run the plant in Newport, Indiana, which manufactures Sarin nerve gas "twenty-four hours a day."

## SRI'S NUCLEAR ROMANCE

Not all of the work that SRI has done for the Chemical Corps has been offensive. Conrad Schadt, a research assistant at Stanford after World War II and a physicist in the biological division of the Chemical Corps from 1949 to 1951, since 1960 has been at work on Chemical Warfare "warning and detection."

SRI has, in fact, done a good deal of work for the Office of Civil Defense (the chemical detection noted above was not for that agency), though often enough its purpose seems to have been to continue a nuclear war rather than dig out from it. In 1953, in an article published by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists entitled "Industrial Defense: A Community Approach," William Platt, then an SRI economist, discussed "post-attack industrial rehabilitation"—"Restoring essential production refers not only to the problem of restoring the damaged production lines for the most important war goods," he said, "but also to preparing for conversion and mobilization" for war.

In 1955, SRI designed a "high-speed damage assessment system" for the Office of CD, and its recent publications of research done of CD include such titles as "Secondary Ignitions in Nuclear Attack," "Area-Wide Shelter Systems," "The Effects of Nuclear Attack on Rail Activity Centers," "Evaluation of Nuclear Weapon Thermal Threat," and "Introduction to the Biological Effects of Nuclear War." SRI was just last month awarded a \$2,363,555 contract by the Office of Civil Defense for research which is "classified in nature."

## GAMES WITH THE RED ARMY

A recent SRI contract that sounds as if it might be a Civil Defense contract but is not is entitled "Problems posed by conflicting views concerning nuclear weapons." Awarded by the War Department, one can only assume that its ultimate purpose is to change those views so as to "permit" the use of nuclear weapons in limited warfare, a suggestion made by SRI's "Limited Warfare" in 1957. See, too, another recent War Department contract to SRI: "Research on interaction between U.S. and U.S.S.R. military postures, programs, and strategies, and use of such interaction to mold Soviet military behavior." Games, games theory.

This is Cold War, taken seriously and seriously pursued—to our cost and to our danger, I believe. SRI has also recently accepted contracts totaling \$1.5 million for a "study and evaluation of potential effectiveness of

Nike-X antimissile missile system," something in which the electronics and weapons firms with Trustees at Stanford and Directors at SRI are very much interested.

Such, perhaps, is the character of Dean Arbuttle's campaign, announced last spring, to reduce SRI's dependence on defense funds.

Management at SRI has always been concerned with the health of the war economy. In 1963, speaking on "The California Economy" to the California Industrial Development Conference, SRI's Executive Vice President, Weldon Gibson, whom we have heard from before ("the world struggle against communism"... "a further increase in defense spending"—1951), offered "two principal bases for concern about defense expenditures:... possible extensions of agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union leading towards arms limitations /and/ the fact that more and more leaders are supporting the judgment that the arsenal of missiles and warheads has reached the point of diminishing returns." He concluded that "both points appear to sound a warning of major difficulties ahead" for California war industry.

In 1964, however, though at the bottom of the pre-war lull, Gibson saw hope, in a speech entitled "The Bay Area's Economy" delivered to the Bay Area Council Conference on the Future

(Cont. p.8, col.1)



## Mobilization

(Editor's Note: The following is reprinted from the March 18, 1967 issue of Mobilizer.)

On April 15, 1967, thousands of persons from all over the United States and Canada and Mexico will gather near the United Nations in New York and at Kezar Stadium in San Francisco to demand an end to the war in Vietnam. This will be the largest gathering in opposition to the war in the history of the American peace movement. This Mobilization for peace in Vietnam will be in response to the call for action issued by prominent Americans, from all walks of life.

The Mobilization will say to humanity that millions of Americans are deeply opposed to this war and have come together in a dramatic and visible manner to express a fundamental unity of purpose; namely, that regardless of the many genuine differences which often separate and divide us, we Americans are determined to go back to our communities and do all that we possibly can to convince our fellow citizens that this war must be stopped!

The Mobilization will encourage new forms of resistance against the war. It will urge moral and political support for all young men of conscience who refuse to be drafted and to soldiers who refuse to fight an unjust war.

(See Calendar, p.11)

# SRI...

(Cont. from p.7)

of the Bay Area: "Although there seems little doubt that we have seen the end of the era of rapid growth in these industries," he said, "there are indications that short-term losses over the next few years may be recouped later in the decade with new developments in anti-missile missiles or a new generation of strategic weapons." He seems to have been right on both counts.

## Protection of Investment

\* Gibson's concern has never been solely with California industry; rather it has been with world wide industry, development of the "underdeveloped" countries, and "the world struggle against Communism." In 1957 he directed a week-long International Industrial Development Conference co-sponsored by Time-Life and SRI of which the theme was "Investment—Key to Industrial Development." Attended (Time said) by "an international Who's Who of high finance and high office," the "most widely applauded concrete proposal of the conference" was made by Hermann Abs, a German financier, who suggested "the creation of an International Convention" which would establish an enforceable rule of law to protect foreign investment from nationalization, expropriation, and such "indirect interference" with the rights of foreign capital as a nation's "withholding of essential raw materials, refusal of import licenses, and excessive taxation."

On April 12-15 of this year, Gibson will direct the first meeting of the Pacific Industrial Conference which will be attended by "business leaders from 29 nations," among them Taiwan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam. The theme of the conference will be "Free Enterprise and Pacific Development," but the meeting is closed—by invitation only—and Mr. Gibson's secretary explained to me on the phone that "because of the nature of these conferences our participants will not attend unless they are sure that we will not make their names public." But she assured me that "thirty of the biggest industries and banks in Australia" would be represented.

## Thailand

SRI's involvement with Thailand is instructive. According to the New York Times for March 20, the Defense Department has 157 researchers in Thailand working on "Project Agile"—"the Pentagon's world-wide counter-insurgency research project"—with an annual budget of \$10 million. SRI is reported to be one of its subcontractors and has, I know, two announced projects in Thailand, SEACORE and SEASHORE, about which it will say nothing. In 1964 William Platt, SRI's Director of Manpower and Educational Research, concluded a study commissioned by the Agency for International Development and the Government of Thailand to "make recommendations as to the appropriate and required machinery in the Thai Government of the integration of human

resource and educational planning with the planning for over-all economic and social development."

## EDUCATION—SPUTNIK, THAILAND

Besides being SRI's Director of Manpower and Educational Research, Platt is also lecturer in Education at Stanford and a member of the six-man faculty of SIDEC (Stanford International Development Education Center). It was he who in 1957 made arrangements with McDonnell for the research and publication of "Limited War," and it was he who in a civil defense publication, "Industrial Defense," in 1953 discussed post nuclear attack—"industrial rehabilitation... that will allow us to go on and win." In an introduction to a issue of the SRI Journal in 1962 that discussed arms control and disarmament, he wrote that "to help protect our free society's values, national security policies have many facets: the creation of military strength to deter warfare; cooperation in defense and development with other Free World countries; the development of better means of controlling weapons of war in a responsible fashion (arms control), and the search for a viable and safe means of reducing arms (disarmament). Stanford Research Institute has been privileged to participate in studies related to all of these facets."

Platt seems to be one of those men who have adopted the prevalent attitude, changed as it changed, and whose best hopes have been dashed in the Vietnam war. Whether his educational philosophy will be satisfactory to the oligarchic and authoritarian Thai government, I am not sure, but I think it likely that they will make it so, and that the job will not be too hard, no matter how sincerely Platt believes he is concerned with individual freedom.

In a speech entitled "Post Sputnik Competition," given before the Workshop in Education of Gifted Children at San Jose State College in 1958, Platt remarked that "we at the Institute feel that the key to long range military deterrence is the creativity of individuals in the nation's research and development establishment," and he added that "the scientists and technicians who will determine...this country's weapons technology in 1975-85 have already reached high school." And their schoolmates are fighting, now, in Vietnam.

There seems to be in PLATT a characteristic contradiction between stated democratic belief in individual freedom and totalitarian manipulation. In his speech he argued that in the United States "the objective of education is individual development with freedom and opportunity to choose one's life work," but he maintained that "people are really the ultimate resource," that education is the means by which we train this human resource, and that "we cannot afford to waste individual talent." Yet he censured Russia because, there, "the function of education is to serve the state." "Our ingenuity, properly alerted and led," he concludes, "is that of millions of people—whereas theirs is constrained by a central dogma." Platt's is a tragic confusion—and a very serious one—but it will not, I think, make him less attractive to the Thai oligar-

chy. That it has not made him unattractive to US AID is telling.

Presently with Platt in SIDEC is Eugene Staley, Professor of Education at Stanford and Senior International Economist at SRI. I have been told that Staley is a very nice man, a kind man, and I do not mean to dispute that. But his history with SRI and Vietnam is worth some study. Staley is apparently a liberal. At times when it was not popular to do so he argued that this country must share its wealth, strengthen the UN, and adopt a more flexible international position for peace. Yet in 1961 he appears to have been party to, if not author of, a rather brutal means of population control by which Ngo, Diem and Nhu attempted to maintain power; and so far as I know, he has made no indication that if he had it to do again, he would do otherwise.

## STALEY'S UNDERDEVELOPED WORLD

In 1954 Staley published a book for the Council on Foreign Relations (David Rockefeller, Vice-President, Allen Dulles, a director) entitled The Future of Underdeveloped Countries; Political Implications of Economic Development; at the same time he gave a talk in Stanford's Tuesday Evening Series, "American Interests and Underdeveloped Areas of the World." Both of these indicate the horns of his dilemma.

In Staley's talk there was immediately apparent a concern liberally to define American "enlightened self-interest." He warned that "the magnificent achievements of science and technology...could destroy the whole edifice of civilization, if the social and moral progress necessary to avoid wars cannot be achieved in time." Furthermore, he suggested that "either the benefits of modern civilization...will also become widely available in the non-Western world...or these benefits will be lost even to us in the West," and he advised that "we must share our blessings or lose them." Yet this sharing must be done with "mutual respect and cooperation toward jointly agreed needs." And in his book, Staley concluded that "the American interest is to build upstanding partners, not to...create satellite states."

Nevertheless, in 1954, Staley embraced a simple and total anti-Communism. Revolutionary Marxism is "a disease of modern industrial society." The Communist aim is "power, total power." The Communist movement is "at one and the same time: 1) an arm of the Soviet state...; 2) a set of national Communist parties, each using in its own country techniques elaborately worked out and tested in other countries for the purpose of mobilizing discontent and ultimately seizing power; and 3) a world view, a quasi-religion, which gives its adherents a pleasant sense of certainty about all the puzzles of history and...a calling to which they dedicate their lives." And "Communism's main thrust is now directed toward the underdeveloped countries as the most promising way to world dominance."

His "first major thesis," given this, then, was that "the future of the underdeveloped countries...is a vital matter for the future of Western civil-

(Cont. p.9, col.5)



# Trustees...

(Cont. from p.6)

Inc., which was begun as an industrial distribution firm by his grandfather C.L. Ducommun in 1849. Mr. Ducommun has been extremely active in business, education, politics, and civic affairs.

In addition to his position at Ducommun Inc., he is a director of Lockheed Aircraft Corp. One of the subsidiaries of Ducommun, Inc. is Explosive Technology Inc., which develops, manufactures, and markets plastic and metal clad detonating chords, detonators, and ordnance devices and systems for operational aircraft, spacecraft and weapons. Explosive Technology is a defense contractor and so, of course, is Lockheed which produces F-12, F-104, P-3, SR-71 military aircraft; C-130, C-141, C-5 military transports; radar, gunfire control, anti-submarine warfare and underwater tracking systems; and Poseidon and Polaris tactical missiles. Lockheed (see Reference #2) is the nation's largest defense contractor and does some of its military research in Stanford Industrial Park.

## Republican Clairvoyance

Thus, the Republican Party evinced a kind of clairvoyance when they appointed Mr. Ducommun as Chairman of the Task Force to Evaluate Impact of Science and Technology before the 1960 Convention and just after his stint on the Republican National Finance Committee. He has also served as a member of the Advisory Committee on World Trade to the U.S. Department of Commerce. Also of interest is his welfare work. Since 1950, Mr. Ducommun has been a director of the Los Angeles Welfare Federation and the Los Angeles Area Building Funds Inc. Watts.

A dedicated alumnus, Mr. Ducommun spoke about the university at the 1966 Stanford Leadership Conference. He said in part: "Certainly most of us abhor the few student extremists who do not yet fully realize how their overly publicized actions hurt the Stanford they profess to love. The great majority of Stanford students take quiet unheralded action for the betterment of civilization by working on necessary university and community projects."

Roger Lewis received a B.A. from Stanford in 1934 and was appointed a trustee of the University in 1964. He is president and chairman of General Dynamics Corporation.

Mr. Lewis has spent most of his career in aircraft, defense, and defense-related industries. He began with Lockheed in 1934 and was assistant sales manager when he left in 1947 to join Canadair Limited, Montreal where he was vice-president for sales. He joined Curtiss-Wright Corporation in 1950, becoming a vice-president and in March 1953 he was appointed Assistant Secretary of the Air Force. In that capacity he was responsible for such areas as material, supplies and equipment, industrial resources, and civil aviation. In 1955 he joined Pan-American World Airways as executive vice president for defense and development projects. Then, in 1962, he became President of General Dynamics following the resignation of GD chairman, the former Secretary of the Army, Frank Pace, Jr.

General Dynamics has been for many years one of the nation's leading defense contractors. They produce the F-111 tactical fighter, nuclear submarines, avionics systems for target landing and accurate bombing, FB-111 bombers, Redeye air defense missiles, mobile radio systems for field use, anti-submarine systems, CL 91 amphibious vehicles, surface-to-air Standard missiles and the Terrier and Tartar air-defense missiles. In fiscal 1966 GD did \$1,136 million worth of defense work.

Mr. Lewis was described by a former associate as an executive who "knows how to bore to the heart of the matter." He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.

Edmond W. Littlefield is also a Stanford graduate. He received his A.B. in 1935 and M.B.A. from the Graduate School of Business in 1938. He has been a trustee of the University since 1958.

Mr. Littlefield is President and Director of the Utah Construction & Mining Company, chairman of the Board of Marcona Mining Co., a UC&M subsidiary which operates a large iron ore deposit in Peru, and a director of General Electric Co. Utah C&M, as has been noted, is involved in defense work at the Grand Forks and Malmstrom Air Force Bases and is a tenant in Stanford Industrial Park. General Electric was the second largest defense contractor in fiscal 1966. They produced 7.62 mm aircraft machine guns, M61A1 20 mm guns, XM12 armament pads, various phases of the Minuteman, Chapparral, Poseidon, and Polaris missiles, airborne electronic counter measure equipment, gun-sights for F-4 aircraft, propulsion machinery for nuclear submarines, engines for T38 and F5 aircraft and UH1 and CH3 helicopters. GE also sells diesel electric locomotives to the Republic of South Africa.

## Challenge of Communism

In a speech which he delivered to the Stanford Alumni in 1959, Mr. Littlefield explained his sense of the political importance of the university. He said in part: "The challenge of communism, both in the political front and in the battle for man's minds, carries with it a sense of urgency and a continuing threat that should show up our determination to get the job done. It is sad but true that recognition of the problem has not gone hand in hand with effective implementation of its solution. The nation needs and almost demands that the educational system, should produce more students and better trained students and perform the fundamental research necessary to expand our knowledge, either to defend ourselves in the struggle for survival or, hopefully, to bring about a standard of living and social well-being that could result from knowledge intelligently applied to a world at peace."

Because we are increasing both the size and frequency of Resistance, we find ourselves in need of private donations to supplement our regular financial resources. If you would like to assist, please send your donation (anything you feel you can afford) to The Experiment, c/o ASSU, Stanford, California. Thank you.

# SRI...

(Cont. from p.8)

ization," including the "security and the way of life of the American people." Economic development of these areas "in cooperation with the West" became a necessary precondition "for Western survival and for the survival in the world of some of the West's most important contributions to human progress."

But, of course, if "Communism" cannot be tolerated then "the West" in the end must impose itself upon those areas which are most actively threatened—and do so howsoever is effective—which is just what Staley later finds himself involved in. Such a policy, however, makes the choice to "cooperate" with the West no choice at all, since the alternative is not to cooperate with someone else, but to find marines in one's capital city. This "choose, but choose our way" proposition of Staley's is the same as that offered in education by Platt.

## Balance of Power

Staley was certain that "if the resources of the West are really brought to bear on the development problem, then the Communist challenge can be met successfully." We were to show the people that in fact the "non-Communist world" offered them "more" than does the Communist world in "genuine progress toward the ideals of equal status with other peoples, national self-determination, self-rule, and respect." He was concerned that "our flank could be turned by Communist political-economic victories in any of a half-dozen areas" and he maintained that "at some point the areas now underdeveloped are likely to hold the balance of power between the two...competing systems."

He asserted that "Communist appeals to nationalism and land reform slogans are 'fraudulent' since 'Communist imperialism shows little respect for national desires once a country comes under Communist rule' and 'once they have consolidated their power they . . . take the land away from individual peasants and vest it in state farms'—statements characteristic for their certainty about all the puzzles of this century's affairs.

Not surprisingly, Staley's definition of "successful development" is explicitly anti-Communist. Besides "higher levels of production and real income, widely shared," and "progress in democratic self-government, reasonably stable and at the same time responsive to the needs and wishes of the people," it includes "less vulnerability to Communism" and "strengthening of the over-all resources of the free world and the collective capacity of free peoples against any aggression"—this last apparently ruling out neutrality.

The more I study such documents as this, the more I am convinced that for such men either their vision of "Communism" is a vision of their otherselves, or their vision forces their response into the same coin. To forestall "Communist totalitarianism" Staley strengthened Diem's; to forestall "Communist"

(Cont. p.10, col.1)

# SRI...

(Cont. from p.9)

land reform the U.S. will try imposing its own.

What were American interests in developing the underdeveloped world? As Staley outlined them they were no less than imperialist, economically and culturally. After remarking, for instance, that "no doubt most of us would like to see not only the continuation of democratic government and society in our own country, but the further spread of the democratic spirit . . . throughout the world"--itself somewhat culture-blind--Staley argued that "it is part of our interests that there should be prosperous markets at home and abroad for the products of our farms and factories, and a plentiful supply of the things we need to buy, including raw materials, that, to an increasing extent, are needed from abroad." Furthermore, he noted that "three quarters of the imported materials included in the United States stockpile program for critical and strategic items come from underdeveloped areas, for example...virtually all of our natural rubber, manganese, . . . chromium, and tin"--a statement which reminds me of Eisenhower's that we are in Vietnam "for rubber and tin."

Finally, he argued that "the future course of our own culture . . . will depend in no small measure on what trends become dominant in the newly modernizing areas of the world. This means that our interests are definitely at stake in the cultural changes going on in such areas." On, Disneyland!

Such was the general state of Staley's thinking in 1954. Talking specifically of Vietnam, he remarked that "the Communist-led Vietminh" got most of its political strength from espousing demands for "faster progress toward national freedom than the French were willing to grant." He censured "the West" for failure to recognize "soon enough" the "national aspirations in Indo-China" which had had the effect of "letting the Communists harness the most potent force in the underdeveloped world--nationalism--to their bid for power." He warned that a series of conflicts between "Western colonial powers and local nationalist movements" would be disastrous to the West's position "throughout the underdeveloped world."

## SRI/VIETNAM(I)--"STRATEGIC HAMLETS"

In 1961, when he revised his book, Staley's position had changed somewhat, become "more realistic," perhaps, but it seems to me simply a sophistication of the position we have already seen in its raw form. In 1961 Staley was willing to argue that "the choice in a number of underdeveloped countries is not between free enterprise and socialism, but between a democratic type of socialism and the Communist variety," to confess that "the spectacular production revolution carried out under Communist auspices in mainland China will have a continuing and probably increasing effect on political and economic thinking in the less developed countries," that "the United States, the Soviet Union, and other nations can



achieve security only through some world system which will protect all of them by preventing war--such a world system implies a far more radical internationalism than most of us have ever before been willing to contemplate," and that "we are still abysmally ignorant by comparison with the . . . knowledge that we could reasonably expect . . . were research to be supported in this field with just a little of the sense of urgency that nations devote to research for better bombs and missiles." (Hear, hear!)

In 1961 he argued that a philosophy in which "stop Communism" is central is not only negative but "is unlikely to be . . . successful," but still and all such a philosophy seems to have remained central to him: "We face today the problem of strengthening the defenses of the non-Communist world against the demonstrated readiness of the Communist bloc to expand by any means, including military force and internally subversion," he says, and while he agreed, theoretically or perhaps religiously, that "the only proper aim of foreign policy in the atomic age is the furthering of the interests of mankind," he included among American interests "gains in productivity to be anticipated from wider trade, investment, and raw materials accessibility."

He was still Hobson's man ("this nation . . . possesses 67% of the world's wealth") and Gibson's ("this nation is now passing through . . . a period of consolidation in the world struggle against Communism"). He showed it in Vietnam.

## Kennedy/Staley/Diem

On June 10, 1961, then Vice-President Johnson, recently returned from a visit to Diem, announced a special economic mission to Vietnam "to work out cooperative measures for the meeting of that country's most pressing financial, military, and political needs," headed by Eugene Staley of the Stanford Research Institute. Beneath the story announcing this, the New York Times, with characteristic foresight and wit, ran a story which announced that "U.S. military research specialists are moving into Southeast Asia . . . to learn what kinds of special arms are needed to combat Communist guerrillas," and in the same issue ran an article headlined: "Army Demands Rise in Manpower."

On October 2, Diem announced that,

as the Times headlined it, "Struggle with Vietnamese Reds is Now a Real War," and he said, the Times reported, that "a report on South Vietnam's needs prepared by a U.S. committee headed by Dr. Eugene Staley had recommended an increase in aid both for military measures and for 'economic and social development.'" Staley's committee was supposed to have considered "measures which could restore security within 18 mos."

On January 4, 1962, the Kennedy and Diem administrations announced in a joint communique "a broad economic and social program" of development, worked out as "a follow-up to the study made . . . under the leadership of Professor Vu Quoc Thuc of Vietnam and Dr. Eugene A. Staley of the United States, as well as later studies." The program included "resettlement" which would be accelerated where necessary to "remove the population from Viet Cong pressures."

The "later studies" the Times refers to are presumably those of Maxwell Taylor, who often shares kudos for authorship of the "strategic hamlet plan" with Staley. For how much either was finally responsible is not clear to me, though so far as I know Staley has never denied responsibility. Douglas Pike, who as a member of the USIA was attached to the U.S. embassy in Saigon to do intelligence work on the NLF, in his book, Viet Cong (Cambridge, Mass., 1966) attributes the plan solely to Staley and remarks that to the Diem administration "the strategic hamlet was an intensified population-control measure to enable it to tighten its hold on rural Vietnamese by grouping them physically into manageable units." He describes the American purpose for the camps, not less but differently authoritarian, as "not only a population-control measure but also an opportunity for meaningful social welfare work or 'winning the hearts of the people,' as it was frequently expressed."

Jean Lacouture (Vietnam: Between the Two Truces, New York, 1966) treats Staley and the "strategic hamlet" less easily. According to him Staley's "research" consisted of six weeks, in Saigon, with Thuc, a Saigon lawyer, under Ngo Dinh Nhu's direction, and in that time and under those circumstances it arrived at "an entire war policy" which proposed that the militia and the national guard be increased and that 170,000 men in the regular army be trained in jungle fighting. Lacouture

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# Mobilization Calendar

SPRING MOBILIZATION WEEK  
April 8- April 15

"We must combine the fervor of the civil rights movement with the peace movement. We must demonstrate, teach and preach until the very foundations of our nation are shaken."

--Martin Luther King, Jr.

## PALO ALTO-STANFORD AREA CALENDAR OF EVENTS

Saturday, April 8: SILENT VIGIL at the Stanford Shopping Center. Noon to 1.

Russell Johnson, American Friends Service Committee Representative in Southeast Asia, recently returned from North Vietnam, will speak at a public meeting, Congregational Church of Palo Alto (corner, Louis and Embarcadero), at 3 p.m.

Saturday and Sunday, April 8 and 9: ARTISTS MOBILIZE FOR PEACE. Art exhibit, poetry readings, etc., sponsored by Concerned Citizens of Palo Alto. 424 Lytton Avenue. 10 a.m. to 6 p.m.

Monday, April 10: CITIZENS MARCH TO PALO ALTO CITY HALL, for presentation of Anti-

War Resolution. Assemble, Lytton Plaza, 4:30 p.m.

Wednesday, April 12: James Cameron's EYEWITNESS...NORTH VIETNAM, and Lionel Rogosin's GOOD TIMES, WONDERFUL TIMES, two extraordinary anti-war films. Cubberley Auditorium, Stanford University. 7:30 p.m.

Thursday, April 13: "WE ACCUSE!" Mass Rally at Stanford University's White Plaza, to indict Stanford U. and its Board of Trustees for Complicity in War Crimes. Noon to 1.

PROTEST MARCH TO SRI (Stanford Research Institute), one of the nation's major developers of chemical and biological warfare. Assemble at The Experiment, Stanford University, 3:30 p.m. Arrive at SRI, 4:30 p.m.

Saturday, April 15: 100,000 PROTEST IN SAN FRANCISCO! Will you be there? Buses leave for San Francisco from Palo Alto High School Parking Lot (corner E) Camino Real and Embarcadero). Assemble 9:15 a.m. Round trip bus fare is \$2.00. MARCHERS ARE URGED TO LEAVE CARS AT HOME!

## SRI...

(Cont. from p.10)

further argues that the strategic hamlets, "surrounded by bamboo hedges and supplied with guard towers able to receive villagers returning from the fields at night," were violently disruptive. "By touching the villages Nhu and his friends touched at the very foundations of Vietnamese peasant culture, where the local group . . . had remained the basic unit"; and "though his 'revolution' overturned a society, it brought no solution to the problems facing that society."

Lacouture believes that the "strategic hamlet" idea was sold Staley by Nhu, which shifts none of the blame, but changes the problem. We are left with a man who, having confessed himself "abysmally ignorant," sits for merely six weeks, in the Europeanized capital city of an Asian peasant nation, and then transmits or allows to be transmitted to his government a plan concerning the social organization of the peasants of that country, conceived by the power-hungry and somewhat mad mandarin in charge of nine different varieties of secret police. The strategic hamlets caused great misery, and now, having undergone two or three changes of name, they still cause great misery--currently we march people from their village, burning it as they leave, and "resettle" them in treeless stockades, policing their movement, oftentimes forcing them to adopt new and unfamiliar crops, and occasionally using them as "labor pools" to do the lifting and carrying necessary to build installations such as at Cam Ranh Bay.

Cam Ranh Bay brings me to my final concern--those ongoing projects of SRI in Vietnam which I have been able to discover. (SRI has a project in Saigon

titled ACTIV of which I have been able to learn nothing.)

### SRI/VIETNAM(II)--LAND REFORM

Working with Staley in 1961 as a senior economist--and with Robeson ("the free world must not lose Southeast Asia")--was William Bredo. Still a senior economist and currently Director of the Food and Agriculture Division at SRI, Bredo has within the past year been three times to Vietnam for the Agency for International Development, twice to perform a study on the "Development of the Cam Ranh Bay: Evaluation and Strategy," the publication from which is "for official use only." Cam Ranh Bay, of course, is the natural harbor which the Administration brags is being turned into one of the major military ports in Asia, and which, some say, the Administration means to maintain as a major military installation in the "containment" of China.

The other project on which Bredo is working is different, but no less serious: he is to draw up a plan for land tenure reform which AID will attempt to press upon the government in Saigon.

#### "Human Engineering"

In the proposal submitted to AID for the project--apparently by Albert Shapiro, Director of SRI's Technology Management Programs and a man who calls himself a "human engineer" (an engineer of human beings)--great stress was laid on SRI's understanding that "it is considered most important at this time to stress a program of land tenure reform which . . . will tend to produce political results that will contribute to winning the war" (my emphasis). Vietnam, Vietnam.

I went to Bill Bredo to ask him about his program and found him ignorant of Vietnamese peasant culture,

of the Viet Cong land tenure reform program, and of Saigon politics. He was unwilling to say whether or not he thought Saigon was sincerely interested in significant land tenure reform.

When I asked him how his land reform program might differ from that of the Viet Cong, he answered that "land reform on the terms we in the United States might think about it is extending ownership to the peasant." "I would imagine," he continued, "that the VC would try to do about the same thing, in order to win political control, and then they would collectivize." He went on to say that the only effective collective farms he'd seen "outside Communist countries" were in Israel, "and they probably came about for self defense from the Arabs." "The possibility of instituting collective farms without coercion is very small," he concluded.

Yet, apparently, Dr. Bredo believes the potential value of a collective or commune in a developing economy is great, if the people involved are sufficiently motivated. In a paper he delivered in 1959 to a conference of the American Farm Economic Association, in which he argued that "rural decentralization of industry...would be an effective method for rapidly increasing agricultural production, promoting rural development, and bringing urban influences to rural areas," he remarked that one way to bring about rural industrialization might be "by making the village the nucleus for providing entrepreneurship and investment capital." "There has been some success," he continued, "in using the village as the industrial nucleus," and he noted as examples both the Israeli Kibbutz and "the recent reorganization of the Chinese village into communes." But "collective organizations of this type seem to require the drive of an ideology and outside pressure to be successful," Dr. Bredo states. "Such conditions and circumstances are difficult to duplicate. Without the driving ideology, the willingness of individuals to subordinate themselves, and the press of outside circumstances, the role of the commune as capitalist does not appear dependable."

#### Knows Nothing

In this he is perhaps mistaken. When he remarked to me that there was only small chance to institute collective farms without coercion, I suggested that that might depend on the particular peasant culture involved. Dr. Bredo confesses that he knows nothing of Vietnamese peasant culture.

But so far as I can make out, Vietnamese peasant culture is ideal for the village-unit agricultural and industrial development Dr. Bredo thinks effective in developing countries. If Lacouture is to be believed, "the local group, bound in its bamboo collar, *has* remained the basic unit, the raw material of public life, and even the basis of private life. The village, even more than the individual, *is* an entity. It *is* the village that *has* to pay taxes, and the village that *negotiates* with the central power. Everything *derives* from that entity, and all *comes* down to it. It *is* the expression of that 'harmony beneath the heavens' that any society imbued with Confucianism considered essential."

The essence of American foreign presence seems to be a relatively blind imp-

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# SRI...

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osition of American will disguised as expertise. To impose on the Vietnamese the American concept of the independent and propertyed farmer may indeed be a more radical and destructive wrenching of the culture than the collectivization that Dr. Bredo fears undependable. While I hope he will find an anthropologist to steer him clear of such things, my expectations are not sanguine--such anthropologists are few, and the time Bredo will be given is too short for them. And I despair that any government bred by Saigon will be interested in anything more than imposing the landlords on those areas of Vietnam from which they have been cast out--such as is now happening in the Mekong Delta, where according to the London Times, "absentee landlords are still riding in with pacifying troops, not merely to grab back their lands but to extort back rents."

Dr. Bredo told me he was unfamiliar with the Viet Cong program for land reform, though after his three-week visit he thought that it has been "limited, haphazard, unsystematic, confused." He said he guessed that "it isn't the kind of program that would interest a great many people."

According to the 10-point program issued at its founding, the National Liberation Front proposes to "reduce land rent; implement agrarian reform with the aim of providing land to the tillers." In its development of this program, the Front proposes to "guarantee farmers the right to till the soil, guarantee the property right of accession to fallow lands to those who have cultivated them, guarantee property rights to those farmers who have already received land." They declare they mean to "dissolve" strategic villages and allow their compatriots "to return freely to their own lands," and "by negotiation and on the basis of fair prices, repurchase for distribution to landless peasants or peasants with insufficient land those surplus lands that the owners of large estates will be made to relinquish if their domain exceeds a certain limit."

Though I repeatedly asked whether he felt the Saigon regime or any other group in Saigon close to power was sincerely interested in land reform, or was just pulling our leg, Dr. Bredo would not answer.

But in fact, on December 1st of last year, the Constituent Assembly overwhelmingly rejected such land reform as will match that offered by the Viet Cong. Although Dr. Phan Quang Dan, who sponsored the bill, urged the Assembly that "we must have a clear land reform program; otherwise the Communists will win," they defeated his proposal, which was to guarantee every peasant the right to own the land he tilled. The proposal got three votes. There is one peasant in the Assembly. It seems naive to me to expect the next "elections" to return a government representative of the peasants or to expect any other government to be sincerely interested in significant land reform.

In the proposal SRI submitted to AID in February of 1966 (the first phase of which Bredo has completed), great stress

was laid on the political value of land reform to winning the war: "In view of the critical war situation in South Vietnam, the proposal emphasis is on political objectives rather than economic goals," the first paragraph says, and it continues: "The Institute [SRI] recognizes that economic objectives cannot be neglected, but it is considered most important at this time to stress a program of land tenure reform which emphasizes social justice, which produces a more favorable rearrangement of the rural power structure, and which will tend to produce political results that will contribute to winning the war." (My emphasis).

I think Dr. Bredo is sincere in wanting social justice and economic well-being for the Vietnamese. He is an economist of experience. But he is backside to. The Viet Cong are fighting to win land reform, and he is suggesting land reform to win the fight.

The SRI proposal to AID suggests that "redistribution and extension of land ownership, coupled with increased security of tenure, should lead to changes in the local power structure, including greater participation and increased power of rural people in their local governments, partly because of a reduction of the power of dominating landlords at the local level." Here, again, it sounds like the NLF program, which is supposedly suspect, and runs head-on into the anti-democratic authoritarianism of the Saigon establishment, which is clear. Before Diem, villages selected their own chiefs, since Diem Saigon has selected the chiefs of those villages they controlled and appointed district chiefs as well. Many have been townsmen, not peasants. Why this should change to suit Bredo or the United States is not clear, especially as the United States is fighting those who wish the change to take place.

## Experiment Reg Concludes Friday

Registration for spring quarter membership in The Experiment will continue through Friday, April 7 in The Experiment building. So far, 275 persons have registered for the original 27 seminars listed in the spring quarter catalogue, leaving room for approximately 75 more signees. In addition, there are two new seminars: one by Mark Lane, author of the best-selling Rush to Judgment, on "The Media and The Kennedy Assassination" (Mr. Lane is living in Palo Alto while working on his new book on the internment of American Japanese during WW II); the other by Rabbi Charles Familant on the plight of Russian Jewry.

Individuals who already have signed up but who have not yet paid their \$10 registration fee are requested to do so by Friday, April 14. We need the bread.

Preview of Coming Attraction: On Wednesday, April 19, The Experiment is sponsoring an on campus performance of The Beard, the controversial, banned-in-several-cities play starring Billy Dixon (as Jean Harlow) and Richard Bright (as Billy the Kid). The once only performance will be in Dinkelspiel Auditorium at 8:30 p.m. Tickets are \$2.50 and can be purchased at the Tresidder Box Office.

"Greater participation and increased power of rural people in their local governments" is a good idea, and SRI is to be commended for having reached it on its own, but it is the program of the NLF, not Saigon.

It is instructive that Bill Bredo and Eugene Staley were close associates at SRI in the period just preceding Staley's six weeks in Saigon. Staley appears to have made major decisions for a situation and society with which he was essentially unfamiliar. Evidence suggests that Bredo may well be in the same boat--on the way to mistake power and single-purpose for American expertise. He says he knows nothing of Vietnamese culture nor of the NLF program. I think him naive in thinking that the character of Saigon politics is going to change sufficiently to permit significant land reform, even if the paddies can be cleared of the NLF and the people convinced they want what Bredo has to offer. It seems more likely that Bredo is facing the same long war that the American Military warn us to expect, and one in which no one cares, in which SRI and AID want his land reform "to win the war," and Saigon to pacify the Americans, in which, most likely even the villagers will reject what reform filters through as a watered-down version of what the VC offer.

Vietnam! Vietnam!

Well, there you have it--SRI: simple anti-communism; overt concern with markets, raw materials, strategic goods; industrial developers of the Pacific; authors of the theory and practice of "limited warfare" and counter-insurgency; research and development for the weapons the Industrial Park manufactures, the Trustees get rich on, and you and I fight with in Vietnam. Developers with Stanford and EMC of the CW arsenal of contingency plans for atomic attack, of the anti-missile missile against rocket attack and economic slump. Players of games with the Soviet Army, anti-revolutionaries in military oligarchies, confused totalitarians who impose decisions and call them choice. Master-minds and minor winds of concentration camps, ends to the war (but not the dictatorship) in 18 months, of bases from which to harass China, and land reform that who knows whom will choose. On a clear day you can cry forever. Vietnam, Vietnam.

Resist.

~~Resistance is published bi-monthly by The Experiment, a voluntary student organization. Opinions expressed in its news and editorial columns, however, are not necessarily those of all Experiment members.~~

We welcome articles, essays, letters, poems, cartoons, and drawings expressing any viewpoint. They may be brought to The Experiment building or mailed to The Experiment, c/o ASSU, Stanford, Calif.

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