

DECLASSIFIED

BY THE AUTHORITY OF THE PEOPLE

Volume I, Number 13

May 12, 1969. BEHOLD: A Monday

Remember: Chairman Mao says, "It is people, and not things, that are decisive."

BOYCOTT



The Freedom to Freeze

"Academic Freedom," says YAF guru Harvey Hukari, "is an absolute; it cannot and must not be compromised." At a church in Palo Alto last Sunday night, an SRI researcher, a man who says he is proud of his contributions to the development of "people-sniffers" for use against insurgents in Thailand, told a group of citizens and A3M members, "No man, no minority group, has the right to tell me what kind of research I can or cannot do. A researcher has the absolute right to do whatever work he finds interesting.

Let's take a hypothetical example. Suppose a medical researcher is interested in the physiological responses of the human body to prolonged low temperatures, the parameters of freezing to death. His interest may be purely academic, or he may have practical applications in mind (e.g., arctic exploration).

The scientist draws up a research proposal. He wants to use human subjects, placing them in icy brine, and measuring the response to prolonged immersion. Body temperature, blood pressure, and other physiological indicators will be monitored as the subject freezes. Of special interest is the length of time it takes the subject to freeze to death.

This is of course only a hypothetical example. No one would provide funds for such a project; no society could allow such inhuman research to be carried out. Right?

Wrong. The experiment was preformed, sponsored by government funds, and using human (Jewish) subjects. Hitler's scientists needed to know how long pilots downed in the icy North Atlantic could be expected to survive, to know how long rescue efforts should be continued.

When the interests of power found a "need" for the research described, there were myths and rationalizations on hand to expedite the work and absolve the scientists from any moral responsibility. The myths and rationalizations are still with us; how long will we continue to cling to them?

by Ned Groth



"The knife of reason cuts deep."
--Shakespeare



"Why a boycott?", the liberal student asks. "Why, when I am studying to be a humanitarian (a doctor, teacher) and want to combat Life's problems in a skilled, professional way? I like my classes -- in fact, that is what I am here for! Sure, I agree with the demands of the April 3rd Movement, but I see no reason to detract from my education by missing my classes."

Education, like everything else in our overcrowded world, becomes more and more a collective responsibility each day. Politics are important to all of us and will be more so in the future. We are responsible for the work done here at Stanford and at SRI as well as for the educational atmosphere of this campus and our own individual educations, whether or not we wish to admit it. Those classes, however stimulating, can never be unrelated to the campus atmosphere (which is presently one of crisis), or to the reality of our world (which is rapidly destroying itself.)

As an African Communist studying in Moscow once cleverly explained to me, the right to think freely and express one's opinions has no value unless it is exercised. This is not to disavow each person's critical ability in making distinctions between acceptable tactics; it is to show that when one holds an opinion without acting upon it in some manner, it is worthless to all except oneself.

The class boycott on Monday will serve three functions: (1) it will focus attention upon the demands of the April 3rd Movement through educational opportunities such as speakers; (2) it will provide an opportunity for everyone on the campus to peacefully express his concern with the research questions; (3) it will demonstrate to the Trustees our solidarity in the eleventh hour of the SRI question and make them realize that the educational atmosphere has been disrupted not by the boycott or by sit-ins but by the presence of unacceptable research and unresolved issues on our campus.

A sense of urgency pervades the Stanford campus. An atmosphere must be developed here which is conducive to education, to nonpartisan examination of problems. That sense of urgency can be lightened only by the Trustees in their meeting on Tuesday. We must make an effort to show the Trustees that we care about that meeting -- for the sake of, not in spite of, that 'education' which we so desire. Boycott!

by Tori Block

WHY ENCINA?

Last fall SDS raised objection to Stanford and SRI's involvement in Southeast Asia. While a committee was formed to take up the SRI question, campus concern was not extensive. The issues emerged most clearly before the community on January 14 when a small group of students engaged in a symbolic confrontation with the Board of Trustees--the remote and silent group of men and women with the power to meet the SDS demands. SDS got no response from the trustees, and a very negative response from most of the community.

But in the SJC hearings which followed the confrontation, the defendants used a strong collective defense which developed greater support for the original demands. In the context of new support and interest, SDS demanded an open meeting of the Trustees in March. The University Advisory Committee stepped in at that point to propose a forum for March 11. That meeting proved disastrous for the Trustees, and was the impetus for the formation of the April 3rd Movement.

Campus and community groups called the April 3rd meeting to formulate a set of demands to the Trustees: those present voted to retain SRI and to end CBW, counter-insurgency, SE Asian War-related and classified research at both Stanford and SRI. They also demanded an open decision-making meeting in May. The Trustee response to these demands on April 8--a moratorium on new CBW contracts at SRI and a hearing of some sort on the SRI question--was clearly inadequate. On April 9 several hundred people voted to occupy the Applied Electronics Laboratory.

Much of the appeal of the AEL sit-in lay in the fact that it was non-violent direct action: the A3M people began to implement at least one part of the demand by stopping objectionable research in electronic warfare. At the same time the building served as an effective base for the Movement, as space for a growing community. In addition, the printing presses allowed us to publish the SRI pamphlet, "The Goods on AEL", "Declassified" and thousands of leaflets which kept the issues before the community. The result of this "disruption" was fairly massive support for the original demands. With the revelation of information about the Baxter Committee's work, obtained from AEL files, the Academic Senate began to move toward abolishing secret research on campus. When President Pitzer ordered the building closed and people felt the sit-in had achieved most of what it could, we left.

In the period after leaving AEL, people had very different expectations of the faculty and Trustees. Some felt they knew what both would do, others wished to wait for their suspicions to be confirmed. The movement continued its educational campaign, but lacked an adequate base, printing facilities and the sense of community to sustain a high level of work. Two meetings of the Academic Senate on the SRI question were inconclusive, and were interpreted by many as an indication of faculty unwillingness to support the goals of the Movement.

The Trustees were even less responsive. Ignoring the A3M demand for an open forum with all the trustees, they structured a hearing for April 30 which guaranteed their continuing silence. When the participating Trustees refused once again to express their personal positions on research at SRI--despite the fact that the issues had been before them since last October--A3M members left the hearing.

A meeting began outside Memorial Auditorium. It adjourned for dinner and reconvened in the Tresidder large lounge. The tone of the evening meeting was tense, and perhaps reflected the division between those who believed that the faculty and the Trustees would do nothing and those who wished to wait at least for faculty action. A cramped room, breaking, a move to close debate and the ensuing scuffle, and disputes about voting made the evening

extensive debate impossible. The political arguments and the implications of another sit-in were not clearly laid out; objections and uncertainties were not resolved in the confusion of the meeting. The vote was in favor of a sit-in, and the meeting moved to Dinkelspiel to choose a building. Again, debate was not extensive, but there was disagreement between those who felt we should take a building which--like AEL--was involved in objectionable research, and those who felt that the time had come to apply greater pressure on the trustees by threatening to disrupt "business as usual."

Those who argued in favor of occupying Encina felt that another "educational" sit-in was not enough; the community had expressed itself, but that had not made the trustees respond. If we wished to win the demands, then we had to act before the trustees made their decision. Otherwise we would merely be reacting to a fait accompli. To many who felt that the faculty or trustees would still respond favorably and accept our demands, the move seemed



pre-mature. In the end, disagreement grew out of people's analysis of how serious a conflict existed between our demands and the interests of the Trustees--who after all would make the final decisions.

To many in the Movement, what has happened at Stanford this spring seems like an analogy to the struggle against the war in Vietnam, but it is more than that. We are engaged in a conflict with the kind of men--and some of the very men--whose interests got us into Vietnam, and whose disenchantment with the rising costs of that conflict will eventually get us out. As the War goes on, their university moves closer and closer toward becoming one of those costs: their control is threatened. The struggle at Stanford, then, is a microcosm: the Trustees' intransigence will not give way to moral persuasion or majority votes any more than our outcries have ended the war. If this view is correct, then the Trustees will respond only to rising costs.

The occupation of Encina Hall raised the ante. It was an attempt to speak to the Trustees.

Encina . . .

tees in a language that they could understand--the language of cost and control. The use of police and the capricious court injunction were not because of a few broken doors or a typewriter. The clearly perceived threat centered around the disruption of "business as usual" and in inquiry into files most of us have never seen. The recent history of Stanford's administration has never been marked by unnecessary force; the lesson of Encina was that serious threat is met with serious reprisals.

Why is Encina so important? Any further disruption would have had and will have certain costs. A university depending for support on conservative alumni and **research agencies** which prefer stability cannot tolerate continuing disturbances. Faculty are not likely to come to or to remain at a university whose future is questionable. High school seniors and their parents prefer the calm promised in university handbooks, not the tension of a university ruled by men who guarantee continuing conflict. The men who run Stanford understand this better than we do.

Beyond the general problem, they know that certain buildings are more important to control than others. As the complaint filed by the Trustees' law firm states, and it comes as no surprise to many of us, Encina Hall is "commonly known as the nerve center of the University..." (emphasis added)

In Encina Hall, we did more than threaten the payroll and the office functions of that nerve center. As President Pitzer explained in the Daily, he was forced to call in the police because of "the willfull entry into files of great importance to the University". Provost Lyman refers to "the fact that Encina contains not one, but a wide variety of sensitive and important repositories of information." Clearly, our willingness to look at such files was the final threat that brought in the police. In AEL some people proved willing to look at unclassified files; their contents surprised the community in general and the faculty in particular. — What was so important about the Encina Files?

Perhaps there is nothing to hide. We cannot know. All we can do is speculate on the basis of the university's statements and actions. Clearly, the combined threats mentioned above led to extreme action. Our decisions to leave Encina saved the University from the bloody busts that have plagued other campuses. But the subsequent reprisals of suspension, injunction, and perhaps expulsion, are serious indeed. They begin to suggest how are the University will go before acceding to just demands when its interests--that is, the interests of the people who run it--are seriously threatened.

--by Jim Shoch and Paul Rupert

This ad has been accepted by Declassified
and turned down by the Wall Street Journal --

SRI A BAD RISK

A recent cost-benefit analysis has found that due to the unstable investment climate created by the insurgent activities on the Stanford campus, and in view of the extreme likelihood that such activities will continue, purchase of the Stanford Research Institute (SRI) would entail serious risk and would prove to be highly unprofitable. While market conditions remain in such an uncertain state, prospective buyers should reject any consideration of purchase of SRI.

Friends of the April 3rd Movement

Yet Again

Once More

"This nation occupies 6% of the land area of the world, has 7% of the world's population, but it now produces 50% of the world's goods and possesses 67% of the world's wealth. Research must be the heart, the foundation, the lifeblood of our present defense economy if we are to maintain this position."

--Jesse Hobson, Director of SRI in 1951

Since its inception in 1946, SRI has moved from doing retail marketing research into doing weapons systems research, chemical-biological warfare research, counter-insurgency research, and investment studies supporting U.S. corporations' further economic penetration of Southeast Asia and other Third World countries. The SRI Report attempted to suggest solutions to the problems of SRI's future.

Positions and solutions can be divided between two and sometimes three factions in the Committee: the radical position of Cleaver, Bauer, and Bernstein, and the liberal-conservative position of the majority, with Lyman and Scott tending to the right of the majority.

1. Lyman and Scott's motivation was to maximize the financial gains to the University resultant from outright sale, only minimally restricted if at all: "Either destructive retention or gratuitous severance from the University of a capital asset with a value of from \$25 million to \$45 million seems a course hardly deserving any consideration by responsible men."


2. The majority's concern lay more with the effects of SRI's influence on a "neutral educational institution" model of Stanford, generally stressing the academic inappropriateness of industrially-biased or defense-biased research to that model. They hoped that a sale with restrictive covenant could be worked out so to eliminate CBW and some counter-insurgency, as well as Vietnam-related research. (See below for legal aspects.)

Their basic argument was that SRI provided applied research opportunities,

consultantships, and other economic or technical benefits to Stanford faculty and students while hurting Stanford's reputation by doing work that they implied was intellectually and/or morally questionable. They asserted that Stanford's and SRI's problems were largely due to their legal relationship, and so they attempted a compromise which depended upon the restrictive covenant to solve the moral and political costs of the SRI-Stanford relationship.

3. The radical position stressed the political and moral shallowness of Stanford's attempts to sell SRI when it was so largely responsible both legally and historically for creating SRI. It documented the costs to the Third World of both Stanford's and SRI's research, and foresaw that as knowledge of both Stanford's and SRI's moral-political functions grew, so would guidelines have to be creatively established. They opposed

(Con't. p. 12, col. 2)



Smash The Injunction!

"Plaintiff is informed and believes and therefore alleges that Defendant April 3rd Movement is and was at all times mentioned herein an unincorporated association composed of a great number of persons, their exact names and numbers being unknown to Plaintiff, and Plaintiff, therefore, sues the members of said association by their common name, and individually. Plaintiff prays leave to amend this complaint to insert the names of the members of said association when and if they become known."

The movement is on trial. Not just a few leaders, not just a few of the people most active or visible. What is at stake is the existence of the April 3rd Movement itself and the immediate question of the Movement's demands. The injunction is a clear case of political repression. The effort to shift the focus of the Movement from a political one on campus to a legal one in court is in itself a political response to our presence.

There has been concern voiced for the constitutionality of the issue. The restraining order was issued ex parte; that is, the defendants were given no notice that an order dealing with and regulating their political speech and conduct would be sought. The injunction forbade on penalty of contempt of court any further 'disruption' of the Stanford campus for normal activities. When the Movement publicly protested the clear denial of First and Fourteenth Amendment rights in the injunction, as well as its very issuance in the tradition of strike-breaking and harassment of movements for social change, slight modifications were made in the order, apparently to mollify those who were joining the Movement over the issue of free speech and dirty legal dealings.

It is not enough to be able to understand the constitutionality of the issue. Political power governs and not the con-

stitution. When the two conflict, it becomes clear that power dominates.

It is extremely appropriate that the Trustees should use an injunction to try to stop the Movement. Historically, injunctions got their first real use by management attempts to keep labor unions from organizing, striking, or gaining bargaining rights. More recently, the civil rights movement in the South was hit with injunctions against sit-ins and other demonstrations. The same craftsmen use the same tools.

We are dealing here with domestic counter-insurgency. For we become insurgents when, as a movement, we threaten the power of the ruling class. Our presence at AEL did not seem to pose that threat. They could choose then to ignore us. Token threats by the Administration and Faculty cops dissolved before the confident unity of the Movement and a solidarity statement signed by 1400 people. Holding Encina was holding the "nerve center of the University" according to the injunction. Police action within 6 hours validates that statement. The sit-in was challenging the power of those who rule by halting normal governing procedures. Had there been 1000 people at Encina, it is still probable that police action would have been taken.

Encina was not an effort on our part to seize power for ourselves. We hold on the other hand that the cause of some of the greatest disorders in the world today lie in the economic and political interests of the elite of the United States and that the military, economic and political research now conducted in the universities is an integral part of those interests. As an attempt to blind this awareness, the injunction failed. For it is clear evidence of the use of power to protect the interests of the governing class with power used against our own people when their interests differ from and threaten those of the power elite.

The Real Enemy

The movement must realize that the demands, if they are to be met, involve more than a simple decision on the part of the Trustees. It has been assumed that if the cost of continuing war-related research at SRI were to prove greater than the cost of rechanneling funds to other research, the Trustees themselves would decide to meet our demands.

This analysis seems to me to be somewhat naive. The assumption is that the Trustees' cost-benefit analysis will yield figures for the value of war related research at SRI, values for the benefit of its success, and values for its effectiveness in the military-industrial-university complex. The view also assumes that the Trustees and Adminis-

The Struggle



tration have complete control over their resources and act as a monolith with regards to their interests.

The Trustees as directors of Stanford and SRI are not dictators of all the activities in those institutions. Rather, they select the options from the 'market' that lead the institutions in the direction the Trustees want them to go. Trustees' power comes from controlling capital to buy various related commodities such as education, personnel, research and technology. The Trustees' decision to turn Stanford into a "technical community of scholars" was implemented not by personal fiat, but by controlling the uses of Stanford's resources. They direct their corporations to rent land and to provide employment and financial support to researchers whose work involves the university in the military-industrial complex.

Individuals who become part of this complex as employees, administration, faculty and students, do not necessarily identify their interests with those of the trustees, but as resources of the university, their work supports them. Moreover, a researcher interested in

counter-insurgency may be invited to work at SRI because he brings in government grants or important information. He may be drawn by financial rewards, academic prestige, and so on. He may see his interests as independent but merely temporarily parallel to those of the trustees. That his work will protect Trustee directed industries and investments is more a consequence of the structure of the military-industrial-university complex than the will of a particular researcher or even a particular group of Trustees. The Trustees do not have to specifically direct the activities of Stanford and SRI. That is accomplished by the structure of the system whose resources they control.

in Perspective

It would be unnecessary for them to issue an edict prohibiting any specific activity for which funds are now available. They have structured the organizations and their inter-relations so that funds are available for activities in their interests.

The trustees then must not be our only focus in acting for the demands. If we had only to cost them the possible value of counter-insurgency or war-related research at SRI we might not be far from having our demands met. Clearly our demands imply a much greater cost than can be determined by looking only at the current Stanford-SRI relationship. In addition, in order to meet these demands the Trustees would have to issue a specific directive which would in essence interfere with the workings of the market.

A significant threat to the Trustees would be loss of control over campus resources. To threaten this is effective because it limits the usefulness of the university to the Trustees' interests.

Our actions can also work toward

(Con't. p. 12, col. 4)

Know Your

Senate Resolution:*

The Senate of the Academic Council recognizes that the Report of the Stanford-SRI Study Committee was rendered to the President of the University to assist in the formulation of his recommendations to the Board of Trustees, and that a final decision on this matter does not lie within the jurisdiction of the Senate. Nevertheless, the actions of the Board will have a far-reaching impact on the community, and therefore the Senate believes it has a responsibility to advise the Board on this matter.¹

The Senate suggests that the President consider recommending to the Board of Trustees further detailed exploration, with professional staff, of a number of alternative possibilities: sale of SRI, participation in the purchase by SRI employees, the feasibility of sale, and the feasibility of other possible alternatives.²³

The Senate further believes it desirable that at least a tentative or preliminary decision be reached as promptly as possible after consultation with the professional staff of SRI.⁴

However, the Senate recognizes the complexity of the issues as well as the level of concern in the community and urges that the results of the further detailed exploration referred to above be reported in the Fall Quarter 1969 and that no final decision or commitment to action be made until then.⁵

In the event that ties between Stanford and SRI continue, the Senate believes that determination of research policy at SRI should involve active participation of research personnel of the Institute.⁶

*Adopted by SU Faculty Senate, May

2, 1969

1. The likelihood of advice being accepted is frequently in direct proportion to the forcefulness with which it is given. This statement validates the Faculty Senate's right to advise on the issue of SRI but gives no indication that the Senate cares whether its advice is accepted.

2. Students are specifically left out of the study group on SRI called for by the Faculty Senate. Since students of the A3M have demonstrated the interest and ability to sustain a detailed study of the inter-relationships between SRI and Stanford, and since they are now in possession of a great body of information on the subject, excluding students from the membership of this committee can only be seen as a direct attempt to exclude a particular point of view in the face of compelling reasons for non-exclusion.

3. Retention of SRI with controls, (voted for by 68% of the students and 35%, the largest single group of the faculty) is herein relegated to "other possible alternatives."

4. When? May 13? June 1? August 1? Does the Senate care? Is the tentative decision to be made only after consultation with the professional staff of SRI? How are they to be consulted? Considering the SRI testimony at the last hearing, are they likely even to discuss the relevant information?


5. We realize that the Faculty Senate has been working harder than ever in its history over these last few weeks. Nonetheless, the urgency of this decision must take precedence over "business as usual." Much of the necessary evidence has already been gathered. Other information has not been made publicly available; once this were to be released, it would be only a short time before this new information can be tabulated and interpreted.

Faculty Senate

Establishment of procedures to this end at SRI would greatly facilitate development of an appropriate relationship between Stanford and SRI and of new research policies at the Institute. The Senate stands ready to form, in cooperation with elected representatives of the professional research personnel at SRI, a conference committee to consider research objectives and policies at both institutions.⁷

The Senate urges the Board of Trustees to work with SRI's professional staff toward the elimination of any projects dealing directly with the development of weapons of biological or chemical warfare at SRI.⁸

At the Friday meeting, the Senate voted approximately 24-16 to "postpone indefinitely" the consideration of a resolution against military counterinsurgency at SRI.



In the last analysis, however, the moral and common sense considerations concerning this relationship between SRI and Stanford have been before us for months and, as the campus referendum has shown, for the majority of the community these are sufficient to make a decision in favor of retention of SRI with restrictions on war-related research.

6. It has always been the principle of the A3M that those affected by decisions must have a voice in making the decisions. SRI professional staff should long ago have begun to consider what kinds of research they want their institute to do. But, as SRI employees have told us, the picture is not so simple. First, SRI employees do not have tenure and are therefore extremely susceptible to pressure from their superiors. Second, since 45% of SRI contracts are defense work, a large portion of the staff are basically pre-selected in favor of defense work. Third, people at SRI have been living under conditions of rather intense internal political repression. These considerations make it clear that institutional changes must be made at SRI before political power can be transferred to employees.

7. Again, we reiterate: Research policy committees must have representatives from groups other than faculty and researchers, e.g. students, outside community members influenced by this research, etc.

8. The Board of Trustees has already placed a moratorium on CBW contracts. We are told there is only about \$40,000 worth of CBW research currently in existence at SRI. If the faculty really meant business here, they would have included counter-insurgency in this restriction.

The Enemy . . .

disruption of the research "market". By threatening security we have already caused Stanford to lose several DOD grants since April. Our involvement has pressured a few individuals to look away from the military for future grants. Perhaps this is why SRI is moving a number of the RSSC staff to other positions in SRI. But we must realize that our demands will have consequences greater than the simple allocation of research funds or the decisions of a few individual men. We must begin to understand the broader context of our actions. Action must acknowledge more than a focus on the Trustees alone; they are, and should be interpreted as, part of the struggle against the entire military/industrial/university morass.

--by Emiliano

SRI . . .

severance even with a restrictive covenant because 1) it would be enforceable only by or through the Trustees, against whose vested interests it was directed, and 2) it could be fought by SRI in the courts while the CBW, COIN and classified research contracts continued unchecked. "The University cannot simply create powerful institutions and then, by act of sale, deny all moral and political responsibility for their predictable future actions." Obviously, rehabilitation of both Stanford and SRI would demand belt-tightening and changes in plans for massive building and growth (more will be forthcoming on these economic plans soon.) Closer ties and massive reorientation of priorities were suggested by the minority report.

