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GUIDELINES FOR RESEARCH AT STANFORD AND SRI

1 A peaceful world requires not only the cessation of war research,  
2 but the establishment of centers of research for peaceful purposes.  
3 We believe that Stanford Research Institute and Stanford University  
4 can form such a center, in which scientists investigate the bio-  
5 logical, psychological, political, economic and physical prerequisites  
6 for peace and social justice. The results of basic and applied re-  
7 search can and should benefit all peoples.

8 These guidelines are intended to orient research priorities  
9 toward meeting pressing needs of the world's population. To do this,  
10 they cannot be separated from the encouragement of new research di-  
11 rections and an enlargement of effective intellectual freedom. To  
12 be politically effective, they cannot be separated from the consid-  
13 eration of the role which Stanford and SRI now play in the defense  
14 economy, in the crisis-ridden cities, and in the wide world beyond.

15 BACKGROUND

16 A "wholly owned subsidiary of Stanford University," SRI was created  
17 in 1946 to serve West Coast industry. In the words of a university  
18 press statement, "The institute plans to do the kind of research that  
19 industry itself might do if each company could set up its own compre-  
20 hensive research organization, supported by the resources of a great  
21 university."

22 Until the 1950's SRI was so concerned with existing California  
23 industries --oil, food, chemicals--that it did only about 25 per cent  
24 of its research for the government. Under Frederick Terman's guid-  
25 ance, the university far surpassed SRI's efforts in developing the  
26 basic science, spinning off the electronics and aerospace firms, and  
27 encouraging industrial parks-together the hubs of the present Cali-  
28 fornia economy.

29 SRI quickly learned the value of a subsidized defense economy  
30 and brought Terman and most of the large defense contractors, many  
31 of the Stanford Trustees, onto its own board and into the list of  
32 SRI Associates. In the past decade it has moved further, from a  
33 "department store" for industrial and military research into a strategy

1 center and intellectual staging area for the expansion of free en-  
 2 terprise into both Eastern Europe and the underdeveloped countries  
 3 of the Pacific Basin. In this role it helps to organize the efforts  
 4 of individual firms from all over the free world, coordinates their  
 5 efforts with government, and builds public opinion to support their  
 6 efforts. Counter-insurgency and CBW are simply two outgrowths of  
 7 the investment studies and high-level business meetings which SRI  
 8 sponsors around the world.

9 BENEFITS OF A CLOSE STANFORD - SRI RELATIONSHIP

10 We envision two positive methodological benefits from the estab-  
 11 lishment of SRI and the Stanford community as a peace research center.

12 Interdisciplinary approach A program of research to benefit  
 13 all peoples will necessarily transcend narrow disciplinary perspec-  
 14 tives and consider the interrelation of many aspects of each research  
 15 problem. The physical impact and psychological implications of tech-  
 16 nological progress must be continually projected. Stanford Research  
 17 Institute has already developed an interdisciplinary approach to many  
 18 of its projects. Our objection to the present content of SRI research  
 19 does not keep us from appreciating the need for this approach. We  
 20 encourage the extension of this approach to all applied research  
 21 problems within SRI and the Stanford community.

22 Scientific cooperation At its best, science is a cooperative  
 23 venture. Stanford Research Institute was originally established to  
 24 aid and supplement scientific research at Stanford University. We  
 25 anticipate that the establishment of a scientific community including  
 26 both the Institute and the University will enable Stanford and SRI  
 27 scientists to share the resources, equipment, libraries and knowledge  
 28 of both institutions. Current institutional division of resources is  
 29 wasteful and often detrimental to the advancement of science. Devel-  
 30 oping a close, rational relationship between the laboratories,  
 31 departments, and institutes at Stanford and SRI will be an important  
 32 move toward a cooperative science.

33 We propose the following areas for top-priority research. (For  
 34 details of specific research topics within these areas, see the posi-  
 35 tion papers written by the caucuses within each discipline.)

36 Life Sciences. Research in the life sciences must seek to im-  
 37 prove both the health and life span of all the world's people and  
 38 the methods by which population on this planet may be limited. In-  
 39 terdisciplinary studies immediately are necessary to find ways to

1 convert discoveries in the life sciences into actualities accessible  
2 to all people, rich or poor, American businessman or African tribesman.

3 Environmental studies. Man has severely damaged the land, sea  
4 and air he depends upon for life. Together we can expand study of  
5 the ecology of this planet, and consider appropriate means of conser-  
6 ving our resources, independently of the interests of corporate  
7 funding sources.

8 Engineering. Engineering research should evolve devices, tech-  
9 niques and systems which will increase man's ability to deal con-  
10 structively with his environment. Cooperate effort between Stanford  
11 and SRI will allow an orientation of engineering research toward prob-  
12 lems of social relevance.

13 Social science. Through their examination of human behavior  
14 and institutions, social scientists can help us to realize our visions  
15 of a more just society. Social science research must enable people  
16 to better understand the forces governing them, thereby facilitating  
17 social change.

#### 18 ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND FUNDING

19 Fears are continually expressed lest the adoption of community  
20 guidelines bring about curtailment of academic freedom. But freedom  
21 cannot exist without responsibility. We have already accepted the  
22 moral responsibility to limit our research in a variety of ways.  
23 Under the guise of "ethical" behavior we agree not to steal someone  
24 else's research ideas, particularly if the individual is young and  
25 in training and would not have the resources to compete with a well  
26 funded, well organized research operation. We agree that research  
27 on human beings, regardless of its scientific merit is not justi-  
28 fied if it jeopardizes the health or well being of the subject. It  
29 is well within our principles for the responsible exercise of aca-  
30 demic freedom to limit research to those areas which do not destroy  
31 life or increase oppression.

32 It is the pattern of funding of research, and not the demand  
33 for community guidelines which is the great threat to academic free-  
34 dom today. Scholars today are encouraged to do the work of the  
35 powerful at the expense of the poor. Close to half of all monies  
36 spent on America's scientific research come from the department of

1 Defense, including non-military projects and programs which, in a  
 2 civilized society, should be justified in terms other than "national  
 3 defense". Industry, much of which is itself subsidized by the DOD,  
 4 finances another important portion of research and shapes the job  
 5 market, consequently the education, for all too many scientists.  
 6 Even the foundations and the non-military agencies of government too  
 7 often reinforce, rather than oppose, the restrictive trends.

8 At this point of reappraisal, we must start the process of inter-  
 9 posing humane guidelines between the marketplace and scholarly re-  
 10 search. To refuse this responsibility is to allow those who monopo-  
 11 lize the marketplace to determine the scope of our freedom.

12 At the same time, we believe that the general public, with the  
 13 aid of the scientific community, has the power and the responsibility  
 14 to redirect America's research funding priorities. We call upon the  
 15 peninsula scientific community--members of Stanford University, Stan-  
 16 ford Research Institute and Stanford Industrial Park, in particular--  
 17 to focus their energy and influence to the redirection of scientific  
 18 funding away from those areas of science which destroy life and in-  
 19 crease oppression.

20 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS

21 Certain research does not benefit humanity. We therefore pro-  
 22 pose the following limitations on research in the Stanford community:

- 23 I. Cease all classified and secret research at Stanford and SRI
- 24 A. Terminate and refuse all SRI and Stanford contracts and
- 25 subcontracts that involve classified publication or clas-
- 26 sified communication of any sort. An appeal-hearings
- 27 process might be provided for researchers who require
- 28 clearance to obtain certain classified information (e.g.
- 29 launch dates).
- 30 B. Terminate and refuse projects requiring security clear-
- 31 ances needed to obtain access to classified information.
- 32 C. Terminate and refuse all contracts funded by sources whose
- 33 identification is not available.
- 34 Maintain central, public files of all communications con-
- 35 cerning research in progress at SRI and Stanford. These
- 36 files should include open financial accounts, interim and
- 37 final reports, memos, letters and notes on verbal commu-
- 38 nications with project sponsors.

1        Explanation: Classified research is directly opposed to the  
2 free flow of scientific information. Classified inputs into research  
3 make it impossible for everyone to replicate work, a procedure essen-  
4 tial to scientific inquiry. Use of classified information should be  
5 allowed only where the reason for classification is not related to  
6 the work being done. Professors and students who claim they need  
7 security clearances to keep up with "the state of the art" or to  
8 find new dissertation areas should be encouraged to do research in  
9 fields which do not rely on classified material. If a Stanford re-  
10 searcher's work is shown to have been done before, but subsequently  
11 classified, the work should count toward degrees and professional  
12 advancement. Classified research does not increase the amount of  
13 information available to the scientific community.

14        Stanford Electronics Laboratory presently has six contracts  
15 worth \$2.2 million requiring security clearance for researchers and  
16 resulting in some classified publications. Stanford has at least  
17 two other contracts of military relevance which involve obtaining  
18 access to classified material, four additional classified contracts  
19 including classified launch dates and similar information. SRI has  
20 about \$85 million in partly-classified continuing government contracts  
21 and an additional \$44 million in fully-classified continuing govern-  
22 ment contracts.

23 II. Cease all CBW research at SRI and Stanford

24        Terminate and refuse any research funded by the Department of  
25 Defense, by other government agencies, or by corporate spon-  
26 sors, that has a strong probability of being used for chem-  
27 ical or biological warfare.

28        Explanation: The distinction often made between "offensive"  
29 and "defensive" CBW research is largely false. "Defensive" research  
30 involves the creation of offensive CBW agents and delivery systems  
31 against which the "defensive" techniques may be tested.

32        The Department of Defense presently finances \$404,000 of re-  
33 search directly related to CBW at SRI. There are \$96,000 worth of  
34 contracts pending.

35 III. Cease all counterinsurgency research at home and abroad

36        A. Cease all research in support of the wars against the  
37 peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Thailand.

1 B. Cease research into methods of controlling or suppressing  
 2 insurgent movements in foreign countries or in the United  
 3 States, especially in the urban ghettos, funded by any  
 4 body, corporation or government.

5 Explanation: The Joint Chiefs of Staff define counterinsur-  
 6 gency as "those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psycho-  
 7 logical and civic actions taken by a government to defeat the sub-  
 8 versive insurgency."

9 Counterinsurgency research which must be ceased includes mili-  
 10 tary operations and social science techniques directed toward sup-  
 11 pressing insurgent or nationalist revolutionary movements, whether  
 12 in Vietnam, Thailand, Peru or Oakland. SRI presently has \$6,236,000  
 13 in DOD contracts relating to the war efforts in Southeast Asia. SRI  
 14 researchers have done "cost-analysis studies of alternative recon-  
 15 naissance routes /read: bombing routes/ over North Vietnam." They  
 16 are also working on hte electronic Maginot line in the DMZ. SRI  
 17 presently has 43 permanent staff members at the Thailand R&D Center  
 18 in Bangkok working on contracts such as "counterinsurgency commu-  
 19 nications requirements for Thailand." SRI's Vietnam researchers have  
 20 worked on a "land reform" program for the Ky-Thieu government, and  
 21 SRI's Thai reseachers have written ethnographies of the "unstable  
 22 areas" in Thailand. SRI has also done counterinsurgency work for  
 23 the Department of Defense in Peru and Honduras.

24 IV. Cease all applied military research and devel opment efforts  
 25 at SRI and Stanford. Terminate and refuse research intended  
 26 primarily for military applications, funded by the Department  
 27 of Defense or any other sponsor, in electronics or any other  
 28 field.

29 Explanation: Work on any devices, systems or techniques which  
 30 promote the efficient destruction of human lives or lateration of  
 31 resources essential to human life, must be ceased.

32 Electronic warfare research done in hte early 1960's is now  
 33being used in Vietnam (e.g. jamming of radar-directed anti-aircraft  
 34 fire). Techniques being developed now will assist counterinsurgency  
 35 operations in the 1970's. The University Committee on Classified  
 36 Research has not performed satisfactorily in reviewing this work,  
 37 which generates classified reports to the Pentagon and requires  
 38 access to classified material.

1 The Stanford Electronics Laboratory is presently doing over  
2 \$2.2 million in classified applied military electronics work for the  
3 Department of Defense.

4 WHY NOT SEVERANCE?

5 Severance from the university, even with covenants against par-  
6 ticular tactics in SRI's overall strategic effort, would only free  
7 the hand of SRI's business leaders and financial supporters to pur-  
8 sue their efforts more easily. It would remove the influence of the  
9 newly-awakened Stanford community and our concern for control by those  
10 affected by SRI, furthering the tendency toward an unchecked monop-  
11 olization of economic and political power in our society. It would  
12 allow SRI and its defense industry associates to pursue their well  
13 publicized planned entree into the "socio-economic market" (including  
14 America's own ghetto colonies, educational and transportation systems)  
15 with their anti-participation social engineering.

16 Paradoxically, it would also encourage a new and -- for the  
17 corporation leaders who dominate both Stanford and SRI-- more pro-  
18 fitable division of labor between the two institutions. Stanford,  
19 through institutional financing from foundations and non-military  
20 government agencies, would handle basic research and development of  
21 skills, supported, for example, by the International Education Act.  
22 SRI could then do the contract research and classified projects more  
23 directly related to international expansion and its defense--quite  
24 possibly the same projects which Stanford University is now re-  
25 fusing, with faculty members serving as consultants.

26 REVIEW BOARD

27 A Review Board must be created which is empowered to terminate  
28 existing contracts and grants and to veto the acceptance of new con-  
29 tracts or proposals which violate community guidelines. All mem-  
30 bers of the Board must accept the sense of the community guidelines  
31 for research at Stanford and SRI.

32 The Board must include individuals with technical competence  
33 to evaluate projects, individuals expected to benefit from or be  
34 affected by research in various areas, and individuals broadly con-  
35 cerned with the use of science and technology by those in power  
36 in the society to achieve political and social ends.

37 It is not anticipated that the Board will need to review in  
38 depth all contracts and research proposals at Stanford and SRI. It

1 is likely that by consideration of titles, abstracts and funding  
 2 agencies, the Board will be able to approve most proposals. It will  
 3 then be free to concentrate on those projects which appear to  
 4 violate the guidelines set down by the community. Provision must  
 5 be made, however, for members of the community to request a review  
 6 of projects by presenting evidence indicating a reasonable possi-  
 7 bility that community guidelines are, or will be, violated.

8 This outline for establishment of a Review Board should in no  
 9 way be construed as an attempt to establish a one-sided body. There  
 10 is ample room within the community guidelines for greatly divergent  
 11 views concerning the priorities which should be given to various  
 12 areas of research. These viewpoints should be represented on the  
 13 Review Board.

14 OPEN DECISIONS OPENLY ARRIVED AT

15 a Deliberations and decisions of the Review Board must be open  
 16 to the community. The University must disseminate information about  
 17 research at Stanford and SRI as well as time and place for Review  
 18 Board meetings. To these ends, a regular publication of the univer-  
 19 sity should list, at least once, all Stanford and SRI contracts pre-  
 20 sently in existence, and then continue to present titles of new  
 21 proposals, with subsequent indication of acceptance by the Review  
 22 Board and the funding agency. In addition, this publication should  
 23 carry essays, articles and letters concerning research at the uni-  
 24 vdrsicity, national and international priorities for research, methods,  
 25 procedures, and criticisms of the new guidelines or the reinterpre-  
 26 tation or possible deletion of current ones.

27 All proposals, contract reports and related literature must be  
 28 filed for community perusal and research in a public library.