

"Many cadets say the most denigrating thing about the programs is that you have to pretend that you're enthusiastic about it all a 'red-hot soldier.' That's why they grade you on 'leadership potential' and 'attitude,'" says Edwards.

The academic credit issue is completely irrelevant, Edwards feels. "The military can always work it out so that their courses have sufficient academic content or their instructors have enough education. The real issue is the outside control."

The philosophy of building loyalty is best explained by the military itself, on page 7 of the *Stanford Army ROTC Cadet Guide*:

Military discipline has many forms, but the purpose of all is the same: to make sure that the soldier is so well trained that he will carry out orders quickly and intelligently even under the most difficult conditions. Good military discipline is a habit you must start forming the day you enter the ROTC.

It is the small things, the innumerable details of regimentation, that the military imposes on cadets to instill discipline. Each ROTC department is organized as a military unit, with cadet officers who have responsibility for drilling and evaluating younger cadets. The Army, for example, has a senior cadet evaluate each third-year cadet on a form called "Pre-Summer Camp Observation

Report," which has rankings for Appearance, Enthusiasm, Loyalty, Attitude, and a long list of other "leadership qualities."

The regimentation is extended as far as conditions on campus will allow. Until last year, all cadets were required to wear their uniforms at all times on campus on a certain day of the week. The *Stanford Army ROTC Cadet Guide* warns (page 9), "Cadets should be aware of the fact that they are under observation at all times when members of the cadre or senior cadets are present. Their reputation stems from all of their actions and activities (or inactivity)."

The largest ROTC department, the Navy, with 113 midshipmen, has both the soundest academic courses and the most strict rules for students. The *Stanford NROTC Regulations* stipulate (page 23),

"Midshipmen shall maintain the highest standards of personal appearance, both while in uniform and in civilian attire. Always remember, you are representing the United States Navy, in uniform and out . . ."

The Navy has a long list of forbidden activities, prefaced by the comment (page 26), that "The end product of the NROTC program is a mentally, physically and morally well-developed officer for the Naval Service. The conduct standards are, in

general, those standards by which the Midshipman will be judged when he enters into active duty . . ."

Among the "class A" offenses, which are grounds for probation discipline or even disenrollment, are

"Joining subversive or otherwise unauthorized associations."

"Use of obscenity or profanity."

"Insubordination."

Class "B" offenses, which are punished by the senior midshipmen themselves, include

"Unmilitary or improper conduct."

"Making frivolous statement or request."

"Improper hair cut."

"Improper shave."

As a matter of military policy, the "attitude" of a cadet is taken into account in determining his course grade for any ROTC class. "The grade will also reflect (the) military department evaluation of how well the individual has demonstrated desirable personal attributes of an officer," says page 8 of the *Cadet Guide*. In May, 1966, a controversy arose at Stanford when it became known that freshman cadets were being offered higher ROTC grades if they would give blood in a drive to support U.S. troops in Vietnam.

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"There might be conditions where I would disobey orders... but I can't really say now. I know that when I get in, I will most likely conform."

Army ROTC cadet

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Besides the academic grades, ROTC maintains its own grading system of merits and demerits, which go on to the cadet's permanent military record. The Navy says that "all midshipmen are expected to participate in and seek positions of leadership in extracurricular activities," and offers one to four merit points per quarter for such things as student government, freshman sponsor, the *Stanford Daily* staff, and so on. In such extracurricular activities, however, the midshipman must act in a manner acceptable to his commanding officers. "It is emphasized that the participation is concerned with activities which relate in a significant way to 'officer-like' qualities," state the *Stanford NROTC Regulations* (page 26). Presumably a midshipman would not earn merit points for helping publish this issue of *Chaparral*. It might constitute a "class A" offense, in fact, since we probably qualify as a "subversive or otherwise unauthorized association."

The little things add up. Dan Spivey, a drop-out from NROTC after two years, explains:

I found that the program tried to stifle me. That was part of the intent of the program—to mold me into a certain preconceived idea in mold my personality into what someone else had judged to be that of an ideal officer. And so you were supposed to consider yourself to be a midshipman regardless of where you were, rather than considering yourself to be a human being.

The epitome of the conditioning is drill, which is naturally mandatory for all ROTC students. The Navy still relies on the traditional close-order marching every Monday to instill the right attitude in the midshipman. But change has come to the Army's drill, which has been renamed "Leadership Lab." For third-year cadets, who are being prepared for six weeks of summer camp, this means realistic battle maneuvers in combat dress, conducted in the foothills just behind campus.

"Most guys probably think it's corny like I do," says one third-year Army cadet who did not want his name used, "but it's funny—the guys really put out at these things. They hit the dirt, they make noises like firing... maybe we're trying to impress the officers who are watching us."

When questioned about such things as the My Lai massacre, this cadet replied, "When you're in the Army, you have to learn to do what you're told. I'm not going to change things, but I might make things better for people."

"There might be conditions where I would disobey orders... but I can't really say now what they would be," he said. "I know that when I get in, I will most likely conform."

When ROTC is viewed as a four-year or two-year conditioning process, the question of academic credit is seen to be trivial. Two or three units for one course per quarter is all that is involved. Academic credit became a key issue when the military decided to insist that it be continued, even after the faculty senate had unequivocally voted last year to remove it from any "programs of military training and education."

Navy headquarters told Stanford, "Academic credit is necessary for a viable NROTC program. To accept a 'no credit' situation would be an acknowledgement by the Navy that NROTC is inappropriate for a college campus."


To the military, academic credit is regarded as an extra aid in recruiting undergraduates, especially in face of declining enrollments. The military has no quarrel with the University




demanding "strict academic quality" in the courses, because for many years the services have been making the courses more academically respectable by shifting much of the role learning to non-credit training or summer camp. The Navy, for instance, shifted "damage control and firefighting" from the classroom to the summer cruise in 1968. The military is also quite happy to substitute legitimate academic courses from other departments for its own requirements. The University administration has helped persuade the political science and history departments to prepare acceptable substitute courses in "National Security" and "Military History," respectively. Army regulations insist, however, that an officer "monitor" substitute classes "to assure compliance with the objective" of ROTC.

* None of these "reforms" will necessarily limit the effectiveness of ROTC in training officers. They might make the programs more attractive to students, in fact.

Mark Edwards brushes the credit issue aside when discussing ROTC. "The University is acting as a conditioning ground for these people into loyalty and willingness to follow orders. That's a simple fact. I consider it the University's responsibility to be humane, and it's not humane to train officers."



People this issue: Ann Denton, Steve McChrystal, Duamuid McGuire, Jim Shoch, John Shoch, Chris Squires, Michael Sweeney and Wally Thurston. We dedicate this issue to the thousands of Vietnamese people who have been murdered by the U.S. Army, Navy and Air Force, and to the 45,000 Americans whose lives were wasted in the service of U.S. imperialism.



(Tom Connolly, professor of mechanical engineering and chairman of the original ROTC study committee, wrote this reply to a KCBS radio editorial in February, 1969, which attacked the Senate's withdrawal of credit from ROTC.)

Our committee did indeed state that "...the ROTC departments are, by their nature, incompatible with the University's primary commitment to unrestricted creation and dissemination of knowledge..." A short example may make the point. An Army lieutenant was recently court-martialed for taking part in a peaceful demonstration opposing U.S. policy in Vietnam. A military officer is not free to express publicly opposition to many aspects of U.S. policy. Does KCBS find it compatible with its concept of a university that faculty members must place their careers in jeopardy or risk imprisonment in order to make profession of a legitimate position in their field? This is precisely the position of the military officers of the ROTC department faculty. This fact represents one basis for our finding of incompatibility between ROTC departments and the University.



but has a positive obligation to speak out against the commission of such crimes by any organization with which he is connected.

It is a bitter thing for one who has served with pride in the armed forces of our nation, and who has tried to contribute to world peace by research intended to strengthen our military establishment, to have to admit to himself that those armed forces are now committing war crimes, and that the nuclear deterrent intended to stigmatize the use of force is being used instead as a shield under which to conduct aggressive war. Yet I can no longer conceal these facts from myself. I beg all of you to face them resolutely.

We know of colleagues in the Soviet Union who have taken steps opposing the Soviet aggression in Czechoslovakia and the abominations of their own military-industrial complex. This takes considerable courage in the USSR, and many of them are paying the price for it. This should shame us into action in a country where non-violent opposition is still sometimes respected. Certainly any action we can take here opposing war and the growing trend toward a police state will strengthen the hand of those in the USSR who are opposing militarism in their own country, just as their actions can show us where our own duty lies.

The application of the Nuremberg precedent here at Stanford seems clear. As members of the Academic Council of this institution, we have not only a moral but also a legal obligation to refuse cooperation with the military operations of the United States Government, including the recruitment of officer corps via ROTC, or the conduct of military research whether classified or not.

Some Faculty Opinions

February 9, 1970

From: Pierre Noyes, Professor at SLAC

To: Members of the Academic Council

Subject: The Nuremberg precedent and Stanford University

Some of us have been aware for years that many of the actions of the United States armed forces in Vietnam constitute war crimes in clear violation of both international and domestic law. Others, like myself, have only gradually become aware of this fact. Even now that the allegations of the massacre at My Lai have been spread in glowing color across the pages of the mass media, some still cling to the illusion that this was an isolated incident rather than an illustrative example of a policy which "...must be minimally construed as tending toward being genocidal in character..." to quote a distinguished international lawyer in our own *Journal of International Studies*. Allegations of a wide variety of such treaty violations have been provided for 1965, 1966, and the first half of 1967 in S. Melman's *In The Name of America*, and at the Stockholm war crimes "trial," the transcript of which was presented to our Government. Failure to investigate these grave breaches of the laws of war is itself a violation of articles 129 and 146 of the Geneva Convention (signed 1949; effective 1956). Under Article VI of our constitution this treaty is the supreme law of our country, and is so presented in the legal manuals of the U.S. armed forces.

The Treaty of London which set up the Nuremberg tribunal was specifically intended to provide a precedent for the enforcement of extant international law as applied to individuals. To quote Supreme Court Justice Jackson "...if certain acts in violation of treaties are crimes, they are crimes whether the United States does them or Germany does them, and we are not prepared to lay down a rule of criminal conduct against others which we would not be willing to have invoked against us." The position developed in these and other war crimes trials was that any individual with a "substantial moral choice" must not only refuse to cooperate in the execution of war crimes,



(Holt Ashley, professor of aeronautics and astronautics, wrote the following as part of a statement to the faculty a year ago. Ashley voted in favor of the majority report on ROTC in 1969. He supported President Pitzer's recent reversal of that decision, however, because it "went 80 percent in my direction, so I voted for it.")

I believe that many of the serious mistakes in the evolution of U.S. foreign policy since about 1950—in particular the adoption of a role described as "policeman to the world"—have been exacerbated by the disproportionate, easy access that the armed services have had to the nation's pool of youthful manpower. Our current grievous involvement in Vietnam is, in part, due to this ready supply of young men. Enlisted personnel can be acquired, as needed, through Selective Service and officers through such mechanisms as the presently-constituted ROTC programs. It is personally distressing to me that Stanford should actively and institutionally participate in the latter process. There is little that the university can do about Selective Service, except to protest the damage that is being done in the area of graduate education. We do have the opportunity, however, to make our views felt by substantial action in the case of ROTC.

From the recommended decisions I see no harm whatever to the vital national defense posture, the word "defense" being construed in its dictionary sense. I believe that small, technologically-specialized, highly-trained, voluntarily-recruited military services are fully capable of maintaining the necessary strategic force: the "credible strategic deterrent," "counter-force capability," "second-strike capability," and the like. These are the military activities which prevent the unthinkable occurrence of a third world war. They also provide an excellent basis from which to carry on arms-limitation and disarmament negotiations.

