

keeping or peace-observation operations generally and on Canada's role in such missions.

Canada has taken part in every United Nations operation of this kind, from Kashmir to Cyprus, as well as the truce commissions for Indochina. In announcing that Canada was taking the unprecedented step of withdrawing from a peace-observation group, Sharp suggested that other countries as well as his own should draw the conclusion that such operations ought to be "truly international," i.e., under U.N. authority. With the ICCS, he said, "There was no chance whatever that our concept of an impartial fact-finding team reporting quickly and reporting to an international authority would be accepted."

Canada's bid for a higher authority to which the ICCS could report, either U.N. Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim or the Security Council, was turned down at the Paris peace conference, with only Britain (co-chairman with the Soviet Union of the Geneva Accords) supporting Ottawa. Using Air America helicopters, the ICCS does better in the way of mobility than did the earlier control commissions, although all team sites have not been occupied. But perhaps partly because of Canada's "open-mouth" policy on the commission, four members with no chairman have not been able to agree any more readily than three members with a chairman. Sharp acknowledged that support by two commission members—Hungary and Poland—of the Communist side in Vietnam was pushing the other two members—Canada and Indonesia—into seeming to back the other side. In fact, Canadian neutrality was breaking down in Vietnam, and this as much as anything convinced the Trudeau government that it had to get out.

While Sharp himself has never been known to take an anti-U.S. stand, statements by Canada's commissioner in Vietnam, Michel Gauvin, were proving an increasing

embarrassment. Gauvin, the ambassador to Greece, was chosen for the job because, as a former World War II combat officer, he gets along well with military types.

When an ICCS helicopter was downed in Vietcong territory April 7, Gauvin accepted the U.S. story (later disproved by Canadian investigators) that the wreckage was moved by Communist helicopters, and he never stopped insisting that North Vietnamese troops may have shot it down. He openly backed U.S. charges that fresh North Vietnamese troops were infiltrating into the South. The interrogation by Canadian and Indonesian officers of four captured North Vietnamese led to a proposed commission report blaming Hanoi, at which Hungary and Poland balked in a bitter dispute with Gauvin.

One is almost inclined to suspect that the Canadians picked a quarrel with their colleagues to demonstrate the commission's futility. Whether or not Canada would have announced its intention to withdraw if there were still heavy U.S. pressure to stay, there is no doubting Canadian faith in international ideals that simply are not present in Vietnam.

The ICCS was never meant to be a peacekeeping operation like Cyprus or the Congo or Pearson's U.N. emergency force in the Middle East. No military force is involved in overseeing a cease-fire and reporting on violations. But a common will toward peace by belligerents and observers alike is required, and the Canadians knew from the start that this was unlikely.

They are not sanguine enough to believe that peacekeeping or peace observation is easy anywhere, nor are they paragons of impartiality. But they are experienced in the conditions necessary for international peace supervision to work, and in leaving Vietnam they not only expose a phony peace but hint at the cooperative climate needed to make peace work anywhere. □

## THE LESS MILITANT CAMPUS

# NO RETREAT FROM COMMITMENT

STEPHEN R. WEISSMAN

*Stanford*  
The students at the country's major universities have stopped seizing buildings and breaking windows, and the mass media are interpreting this as a retreat from social concerns and radical commitments. The president of Columbia University may have set the tone for countless commencement speeches by noting on his campus this year's "nostalgic rediscovery" of the "half-forgotten joys" and "golden optimism" of the 1950s.

Having spent the past year as a research associate at

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Stanford University, and after interviewing dozens of students, faculty members and administrators, I'm skeptical of these analyses. In fact, the students here maintain a high level of critical social and political consciousness, although its manifestations are less dramatic, disruptive of academic routines, and all-pervasive than they were in the days of mass mobilization. That significant minority which was more or less "radicalized" by the activism of recent years has become even more deeply committed to the struggle for major social changes. Far from being disillusioned, they are in general better organized and less millenarian, more strategy-oriented and less contaminated by the excesses of counter-culture "spontaneity."

And they have been refreshed by troops from new movements, particularly women and Chicanos, whose specific grievances often lead to more critical social perspectives. The new campus movement uses the gains of the 1960s—the institutionalizing of a critical opposition